To Dave Ketchum: Your comments below seem to be the advantages of the
different ballot types rather than the advantages of the different
counting methods.
Perhaps we should add a bulleted list of the advantages of each ballot
type. I had overlooked that idea. Now I think it's a good idea -- if we
can keep it very short and not overlap the advantages of the counting
methods.
I am trying to keep my biases out of the document (fairness is very
important to me!), but so that you know what my bias is, I'll say that I
agree that eventually score ballots will be a better choice than ranked
ballots, but so far I haven't seen a counting method that handles them
in a way that motivates voters to vote sincerely rather than
strategically. Majority Judgement appears to be better than range
voting, but as far as I can tell it doesn't "punish" (for lack of a
better word) strategic voting attempts. Yet I genuinely want the
document to say something positive about score-ballot-based counting
methods, so I'm having to rely on feedback from you and others to know
what needs to be said -- in a way that non-expert readers will understand.
Again, thanks!
Richard Fobes
On 9/1/2011 3:03 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Thanks to both of you for worthy effort.
On Sep 1, 2011, at 12:38 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:
OK, this is going to be controversial, but Jameson Quinn and I are
attempting to write one advantage for each of the four election
methods supported in our Declaration.
Below are the versions each of us have written. What does everyone
else prefer?
We know that the final result will be different from what either of us
have written, so please suggest improvements -- either as better
wordings or as requests for what to change.
If we cannot agree on this content, we can leave out these paragraphs
and let the readers investigate each method without us offering any
high-level perspective.
--------------- A voter's view by Dave Ketchum -----------
Mark on a ruler those you would be willing to promote toward winning,
assuming those that you prefer drop out for some reason (in deciding on
a value, consider what would be meaningful in the election method to be
used). Then consider the four systems of voting that might be in place:
* Approval - vote for all that you have marked, perhaps excluding the
least-liked, for you are giving equal backing to all that you vote for.
* Condorcet system - rank all that you have marked, according to their
positions on the ruler, noting that this makes high-ranked preferred
over any lesser.
* Majority Judgment - rate those you would rank for Condorcet. Also rate
the least-liked to help vote counters see how you scale strength.
* Range - same as MJ.
------------- version from Jameson Quinn: -------------
Some examples of advantages claimed for each system are:
* Approval is the simplest of the systems, and thus, in places where
voters are wary of complexity, may have the best chance of passing.
Even at an academic conference on social choice theory, where few
argued that Approval was the overall-best system, it still received
the widest support. It also is a step towards any of the other
systems; any of the systems, if used with an approval ballot, ends up
being equivalent to approval. Therefore, after seeing what issues
arose under approval, we might be able to make a better-informed
choice of which other system to move on to.
* Condorcet systems give the best possible guarantee that the result
would be consistent with a two-way race. When there is a “Condorcet
winner” --- a single candidate who could beat any other candidate
one-on-one --- most people’s sense of fairness and democracy say that
such a candidate should win.
"two-way" means?
* Majority Judgment allows a score ballot, the most expressive ballot
type because it can show the strength of preferences. The advocates of
this system claim that it gives relatively little incentive for
dishonest, strategic votes. Also, by focusing on the absolute quality
of a candidate, rather than their quality relative to other options,
it may help avoid a situation where a polarized electorate elects an
unqualified compromise candidate just because both sides prefer such a
nonentity to seeing the other side win.
* Range also uses the expressive score ballot. This system has been
shown in simulations to give the results which best-satisfy the
voters. It gives the best results in this sense with any predetermined
fractions of honest and strategic voters. It is not known if these
simulations accurately reflect real voters, who might use strategy in
different amounts under different voting systems or in different
factions.
------------- version from Richard Fobes: -------------
Although we disagree about various characteristics of the four
supported methods, most of us agree that:
* Approval voting is the easiest election method in terms of
collecting preferences (either on ballots or verbally) and in terms of
counting.
* Condorcet methods provide the fairest results in the many cases in
which one candidate – the Condorcet winner – is pairwise preferred
over every other candidate.
When there is no single winner, the vote counting must decide among
those best approaching winning.
* Majority judgment uses score ballots (which collect the fullest
preference information) in a way that reduces the effect of strategic
voting.
* Score voting may provide the mathematically defined "best" overall
("optimum") results if voters vote sincerely instead of strategically.
------------- end -------------
Thanks!
(We are getting close to having the next, and possibly final, version
ready to review in full.)
Richard Fobes
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