>Lundell: > How does it keep me honest in that scenario? Presumably I'd vote 1-0-0; > what's my motivation to do otherwise? > >Quinn: > Because there's a small chance that your (first "honest" range) vote actually > will decide between a lottery of some chance of A or C and a certainty of B. > If you haven't voted honestly, then that could make the wrong decision. And > such decisions are all your "honest" ballot is ever used for, so there is no > motivation to strategize with it.
>Lundell: That's always the case with strategic voting when we don't have perfect knowledge of the other votes. There's a larger chance (in this example) that a sincere vote will cause B to defeat A. The more I know about the state of other voters, the more motivation I have to vote insincerely. This is true, of course, of any manipulable voting rule. --wrong. There is NOT a "larger chance" that a sincere (double range voting) vote will cause B to defeat A. There is in this example ZERO chance of that, Also double range voting is NOT a "manipulable voting rule" (or more precisely, it cannot be advantageously manipulated by altering the "please be honest" range-style sub-ballot, and indeed any such manipulation whatsoever will be strictly disadvantageous) As far as I can tell, Lundell has either never read, or has not comprehended, what "double range voting" is. That's a pity because it is a major theoretical advance with considerable philosophical implications, which was sort of the whole point of this whole thread. -- Warren D. Smith http://RangeVoting.org ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
