From: James Gilmour <jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk> I don't think I would have a problem with C winning here, if the votes were all sincere. But that's the problem. They might not be. A and B supporters might just be putting C ahead of their perceived main rival. I suppose this is similar to the "DH3" problem - http://rangevoting.org/DH3.html - except with two main rivals instead of three. As far as I understand, range, approval and Majority Judgement should do OK here (and not forgetting SODA of course). But in the sincere case, every voter has ranked C above one of A or B, and if it happened that C and only one of A and B were running, then C would win and no-one would be bothered at all. Toby >But suppose the votes had been (again ignoring irrelevant preferences): > 48 A>C > 47 B>C > 5 C >"C" is still the Condorcet winner - no question about that. But I doubt >whether anyone could successfully sell such a result to the >electorate, at least, not here in the UK. >And I have severe doubts about how effective such a winner could be in office. >Quite apart from the sceptical electorate, the >politicians of Party A and of Party B would be hounding such an office-holder >daily. And the media would be no help - they would >just pour fuel on the flames. The result would be political chaos and totally >ineffective government. >The flaw in IRV is that it can, sometimes, fail to elect the Condorcet >winner. But IRV avoids the "political" problem of the weak >Condorcet winner. I suspect that's why IRV has been accepted for many public >and semi-public elections despite the Condorcet flaw. >James Gilmour
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