Hi Juho,
Firing off quick responses, sorry:
--- En date de : Lun 17.10.11, Juho Laatu <[email protected]> a écrit :
I think that your method is similar to my single contest method. I believe you
determine
the critical pair of candidates in exactly the same way. However, while my
method just
has an instant runoff between those two candidates, you are possibly letting in
some
other candidates.
That is essential. Those "additional" candidates and extra round with some
Condorcet method (= a good single winner method) are needed to make it work in
the intended way (= according to the requirements in the requirements section).
I don't think there is a big problem on paper... It's quite likely that I
tested in my sim
some methods very similar to your proposal, and didn't report on them just
because I
found them to be .
What would you expect to be the problems in this category of methods? Why are
they less than the best?
I considered them (i.e. your type, bringing in more candidates) less than the
best for
my purposes at the time because there is more strategy in the rank component of
the ballot.
It may be, and I hope I once noted, that transferring all the strategy to the
approval
component, so that said strategy can't be given clear pejorative names, may
just be
a magic trick. But I'm fond of tricks if they're good.
Note also that the target of the method is somewhat different that the regular
requirements for single winner methods (i.e. elect the strongest, not the
compromise candidate). It is planned for a "few-party system" that should be an
improved version of a plurality based "two-party system". But I guess strategic
vulnerabilities should be treated pretty much the same way as with other
methods.
What I found to be of interest, of course, is that very little strategy
remained on the
ranking side of the method, since its main purpose was to resolve a two-way
race.
Your method will compromise on that a bit...
What do you mean with a two-way race? And what is the compromise?
Since my method only allows two finalists, there is only a two-way race to be
decided using the rankings.
The compromise your method makes is that more strategy will be possible on the
rank component.
The idea is to pick the winner among those candidates that can be considered to
be at least equal in strength with "what single candidates of traditional two
leading parties would be". Those candidates were picked by comparing their
strength (= their level of approval) to the strength of the members of the most
liked "proportional" pair.
Yes, I get that.
Do you have majority favorite covered...?
What do you mean with this?
I'm simply asking whether your method satisfies majority favorite. My method has
a rule tacked on to make sure it satisfies it. It's ugly and contrary to my
stated
goals for the method, but seems to be better than the alternative.
Kevin
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