Hi Mike,
--- En date de : Sam 22.10.11, MIKE OSSIPOFF <[email protected]> a écrit :
De: MIKE OSSIPOFF <[email protected]>
Objet: [EM] Let MMPO solve its ties. It elects A in the example. The simplest
is the best
À: [email protected]
Date: Samedi 22 octobre 2011, 15h42
Kevin--
You wrote:
What do you make of this example under MMPO:
49 A
24 B
27 C>B
There is no CW. Standard MMPO returns a tie between B and C. If you remove A,
C is both the CW and MMPO winner. Do you think this can be accepted?
[end quote]
Yes. Because, as I define it, MMPO chooses C. I define MMPO as solving its own
ties. I suggest that
MMPO's ties be solved by MMPO.
Yes, but what will you say when someone asks how it can possibly be that C is
a better winner than A? A has more first preferences, and neither has any lower
preferences. The only difference is that C voters listed a second preference.
Is it better to elect a weak candidate, over a majority-defeated one? (I call C
"weak"
because C apparently could never win the Approval version of this election.)
Kevin
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