First: please do not make minor changes in the subject line, such as deleting the article "a". It breaks the thread in threaded email viewers, making it harder to respond.
Here's my response. I'd written: That looks right. In fact, let's make it more extreme: > > 39 C > 10 C>A > 21 A>B > 30 B > To clarify: These ballots are consistent with your criterion, if the sincere preferences are 39 (C) 10 (C>A) 21 (A>B) 30 (B>A) Thus, your criterion mandates that A wins with the ballots as first described (with B rather than B>A). I am not convinced that A is always the correct winner with these preferences. It would be very easy to assign utilities to these preferences such that A is a distant third. I do not think that it is a good idea to make hard criteria for borderline situations like this. These ballots could also plausibly arise from the other sincere preferences I noted: 21 (A>C) 10 (C>A) 39 (C>B) 30 (B>C) In which case it is very obvious that A is nowhere close to being the correct winner. This is a separate argument for why those ballots should not lead A to win. Is this clear enough for you now? Jameson
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