Kevin--
You said that MMPO, as I define it (applied to its own ties) fails FBC.
Presumably you're referring to an allegedly possible situation in which
Favorite (F) can't win in a
tie, but Compromise (C) can. So you befefit by making C get into the tie, where
otherwise F would have.
You do that by ranking C over F, to lower C's maximum pairwise opposition
(MPO), and raise that of F.
Are you sure that works?
If C can win in a tie, and F can't, then it must be that C has less MPO than
does F.
But, if so, then why do you need to vote C over F to get C into the tie?
MMPO, PC, and SDSC:
There have been conflicing statements about whether PC (Condorcet//MinMax(wv) )
and MMPO
meet SDSC.
I said in an earlier post that Bucklin is the only method I know to meet SDSC.
I hesitate to say for sure right now, but now it seems to me that PC and MMPO
meet SDSC.
Has anyone posted examples in which PC &/or MMPO fail SDSC?
Mike Ossipoff
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