2011/10/28 MIKE OSSIPOFF <[email protected]> > > (Sorry to change the subject line, but this one is much easier to write.) > > > Kevin wrote: > > Mike's method is Condorcet//MMPO//Condorcet//MMPO//etc. > > [unquote] > > No. I initially defined such a method. Then I said that I propose only > > MMPO (applied to its own ties), because FBC is more important than Condorcet's > Criterion. I said that, as I define MMPO, it _doesn't_ include a CW search, > because > I want FBC compliance. > > I propose MMPO//MMPO//MMPO... > > Kevin wrote: > > However, even if Mike's method were just MMPO//MMPO//MMPO//etc I > still highly doubt that would satisfy FBC, because the candidate > eliminations and recalculations make it unclear that votes will work > > as expected. I don't know how to say this much more clearly than that. > But let me ask you, how many FBC-satisfying methods involve eliminating > candidates and then recalculating scores once those candidates are > > removed? Not a one. > > > [unquote] > > I mentioned and answered that argument yesterday on EM. > > I'd say it again today, but I don't have long on the computer today. I refer > you to > my posting yesterday. > > Kevin wrote: > > Hypothetically, off the top of my head, lowering your true favorite > could remove him from a three-way score tie which then (as a two-way) > is resolved for one of your "other" favorites, whereas the three-way > > contest is resolved for a disliked candidate. > > If a compromise (C) could win in a tie, but your favorite (F) couldn't, that > must > be because C has lower maximum pairwise opposition (MPO) than F. > > But, if that's so, then why do you need to vote C over F, to get C into a tie? > > I'll be visiting, staying with, relatives this weekend, and I may not get > much, if any, > time on computers this weekend. For instance, today there's only time for > this one posting. > > Quinn said that criteria cannot mention sincere preferences. > > What I meant was, if a criterion says system X must give result Y for ballots Z and sincere preferences Q, then it also says that X must give Y for Z and R. As long as there is some Q for which (Q,Z) meets the criterion, then Z meets the criterion for any preferences. This is just what a voting system is; if it gives Y for (Q,Z), it gives Y for (Q,R), unless it can read minds.
JQ
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