> strategic incentives, >> > > 2. Whether one ranks a second or third choice could only back fire if > there was a close race between your first choice and one of your other > choices for being the third place candidate in the first stage. This isn't > likely and even then, it's safe to say that the third/fourth place > candidate in the first stage has a less than 1/3rd chance to be the winner > in the second stage. >
You are arguing that the costs of adding preferences are probably nil. But essentially the same argument applies to the benefits. > and LNH. >> > 3. It's no longer 100%, but it's up there. Similarly, there'd still be a > chance of non-monotonicity, but it'd be relatively low and thereby unlikely > enough not to affect voters strategies dysfunctionally. > LNH matters most in a Burlington-like scenario, where it arguably kept the Republican from winning --- the plurality winner and Condorcet loser among the three frontrunners there. That is, by reassuring the Democrats that it couldn't hurt them to second-rank the Progressive, it prevented a chicken dilemma. This is exactly the situation when the almost-LNH of your system breaks down. (I just realized that my "2" and "3" in this list in my prior message were actually the same reason.) > ... > I would likewise be willing to wager a good deal that the diff between > circa 90% LNH and 100% LNH is not a good deal-killer, especially for a > bigger election with potentially a large number of candidates. > See above. > >> >>> >>> Maybe they too are biased in favor of simplicity?? >>> And I don't think the Condorcet criterion is *that important*, as I >>> think in political elections, our options are inherently fuzzy options and >>> so all of our rankings are prone to be ad hoc. >>> >> >> Criterion-based arguments might be brittle in the face of noisy input >> data. BR-based arguments, including those which attempt to account for >> strategic incentives, are not. In other words: arguing that options are >> fuzzy does not give a license to ignore the flaws in your proposal. >> > > dlw: aye, and I do not rely on that arg alone. > > For BR-based args, some of my key args I rely on are: the over-reliance on > cardinal utility assumptions and the import of the number of effective > candidates in an election. I believe based on my understanding of how BR > works that the fewer candidates you got in a BR model that the less extreme > are the diffs between AV and IRV. IMO, 7 candidates is too much for an > election model, because there really only tend to be at most 4 serious > candidates in most single-winner elections. It's because of the cost of > campaigning is too high relative to the chance of reward when too many > serious candidates are in the mix... > Interesting point. I hadn't thought of this as being a pro-IRV (or at least, anti-anti-IRV) argument, but now I see what you're saying. > >> Jameson >> >> ps. While I spend a lot more words on where I disagree with you, you seem >> like a smart person and I bet I agree with you >> 80%. >> > > since you likewise are a smart and sincere person, I'd bet I can get that > to be >>90% in a week or so... > Admirable response. I'd have to agree... but of course, I'd guess that >2/3 of that will be *me* convincing *you*. :) Jameson
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