I'm sorry, I can't find the message that I'm replying to. It was by an apparent
IRV
advocate.
He said that claims about IRV's problems are "theoretical" or "hypothetical",
and have never
been observed. Of course that isn't true.
In Australia, where IRV has been in use for a long time, various people have
reported to us on EM
that it isn't at all unusual for voters to bury their favorite to top-rank a
compromise, so as not to
"waste their vote". Sound familiar? That's what is done in Plurality, in this
country, by everyone who
doesn't consider the Democrat and Republican the best.
And, in Australia, as here, there remains a two-party system, a political
system with two large parties who
always win. Here, that's the result of Plurality. Given the way people vote in
Australia, and the
reason that they give, that might be why Australia, too, has a two-party system.
Theoretical or hypothetical? IRV's compromise-elimination problem is blatantly
obvious:
All it requires is that candidate-strength (favoriteness) taper gradually away
from the middle sincere CW.
That's hardly an unusual state of affairs.
Under those conditions, eliminations begin at the extremes, and transfers send
votes inwards, till the candidates
flanking that middle CW accumulate enough votes to easily eliminate hir.
We'll never know how often that happens unless the raw rankings are available
from IRV elections. But it
must happen quite often, given the common state of affairs that is its
reqirement.
Andy himself implied an admission that voters in IRV should be advised that
sometimes it's necessary
to bury their favorite, to top-rank a compromise.
Do we want a method that needs that? Do we want that when there are plenty of
methods that don't force
that favorite-burial strategy?
Mike Ossipoff
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