Hi Forest--
What made me like IRV (= whole) was that, while not failing in the Approval
bad-example,
it meets (or so I thought) FBC, 1CM, SDSC, 3P and UP.
(1CM is a milder version of SDSC. UP is a stronger version of 3P)
Then, I had to abandon IRV (= whole), when Kevin showed that it fails FBC.
He showed an example in which half of a certain candidate's voters
equal-top-ranked a
certain needed compromise, but the other half didn't. In order for the
compromise to
get enough votes, it was necessary for the equal-ranking voters to, instead,
downrank
their favorite, to immediately eliminate hir.
Does the IRV variant that you describe meet FBC?
I feel that the U.S. voters are so lesser-of-2-evils dominated that FBC is
absolutely
necessary for our public elections.
I've watched someone vote in a rank-balloting presidential mock election.
Though she
prefers Nader's policies to those of the Democrats, she ranked all of the
Democrats
over Nader.
FBC is essential for public elections.
My current favorite is MDD, ER-Bucklin (whole) (where ER-Bucklin(whole) is
defined
as in the electowicki).
It's the Cadillac of FBC methods.
Is there an FBC-complying method meets UP and SDSC and that does better by
other criteria?
Is there an FBC-complying method that doesn't fail in the Approval bad-example?
...and maybe that also meets at least 1CM and 3P.
I call ER-Bucklin (whole) "ABucklin".
So I call its MDD version "MDD, ABucklin".
I've polled two people so far, and the winner so far (among Approval, MTA, MDDA
and ABucklin) is
MTA.
Mike
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