> I don't get it. (I am confused by your explanation of the > algorithm). > How do you think this is better than your latest version of > Enhanced DMC?
It takes care of the chicken problem. But forget my confusing process; the IRV- Condorcet you describe here is a simpler solution, as long as you allow equal rankings, and count them as whole (as opposed to fractional): > > I think a good method is the IRV-Condorcet hybrid that differs > from IRV > only by before any and each elimination > checks for an uneliminated candidate X that pairwise beats all > the other > uneliminated candidates and elects the > first such X to appear. Yes this is simpler. > > That of course gains Condorcet, and it keeps IRV's Mutual > Dominant Third > Burial Resistance property. > So if a candidate X pairwise beats all the other candidates and > is > ranked above all the other candidates on more than > a third of the ballots then (as with IRV) X must win and a rival > candidate Y's supporters can't get Y elected (assuming > they can somehow change their ballots) by Burying X. > > Does your method share that property? > > > 49 C > > 27 A>B > > 24 B > > > > Candidate A starts out as underdog, survives B, and is beaten > by C, so > > C wins. > > > From what I think I do understand of your algorithm > description, > doesn't candidate B start out as "underdog"? Yes, I was in too much of a hurry when I wrote that. Also contrary to my hopes the method turned out to be non-monotonic, because the IRV elimination order can eliminate a candidate earlier as a result of more first place support. Only elimination orders without this defect can be used as a basis for a monotone method. Forest ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
