I think that it's important to discuss why we consider certain criteria
important. That's the necessary
basis of choosing between methods.
And, having that, it's of course important to discuss which methods meet
various criteria that are claimed important.
Let me know if there are errors in the following table:
MAP is Mono-Add-Plump. MAT is Mono-Add-Top. ABE means that the method passes in
the Approval Bad Example.
=========================================================================================
................FBC...3P...1CM...SDSC...UP...MAP...MAT...Participation...SFC...ABE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Approval........Yes...No...No....No.....No...Yes...Yes...Yes.............No....No
MTA.............Yes...Yes..Yes...No.....No...Yes...Yes...No..............No....No
MCA.............Yes...Yes..Yes...No.....No...Yes...Yes...No..............No....No
SMDTR...........Yes...Yes..Yes...No.....No...Yes....?.....?..............No....No
IBIFA...........Yes...Yes..Yes...No.....No...Yes...No....No..............No....No
MDDA............Yes...Yes..Yes...No.....No...No....No....No..............Yes...No
ABucklin........Yes...Yes..Yes...Yes....Yes..Yes...Yes...Yes.............No....No
MDD,ABucklin....Yes...Yes..Yes...Yes....Yes..No....No....No..............Yes...No
MDDTR...........Yes...No...No....No.....No...No....No....No..............Yes...Yes
Method merit order:
I suggest that this is the merit order of the methods for public proposals in
the U.S.:
(After the name of each method, I state how it improves on below-ranked methods)
MDDTR (ABE)
MDD,ABucklin (SFC)
ABucklin (SDSC & UP)
MDDA (SFC)
SMDTR or IBIFA (Participation?)
MTA or MCA 3P & 1CM
Approval
To gain ABE, MDDTR gives up MAP. ABE has tremendous practical importance. MAP
has none (unless
the public insist on it)
To gain SFC, MDD,ABucklin gives up MAP. SFC has great practical importance,
greatly reinforcing
ABucklin's majority rule guarantees.
MDDA gains SFC, but people whom I've asked so far prefer the 3-slot MTA or MCA
SMDTR & IBIFA gain Participation, but it by far most likely that people will
value the
brevity, simplicity, obviousness and naturalness of MCA and MTA, above the gain
of Participation.
MTA & MCA gain the powerful majority rule guarantees of 3P and 1CM.
Some prefer Approval because of its maximal simplicity.
Approval can be implemented by the same voting aparatus used now.
But so can the 3-slot methods MTA, MCA, SMDTR & IBIFA. We vote on initiatives
Yes, No, or not-voted. 3 slots.
We already have 3-slot voting aparatus.
Polling and proposing:
Polling:
I'd ask about Approval and MCA.
I'd mention Participation-failure, and tell why it
isn't important. The added ballot that changes the winner must only middle-rate
the
initial winner, presumably giving top rating to others. No one should be
surprised if
a ballot voting someone else over x makes x lose.
I'd mention the ABE, and introduce MDDTR. I'd tell about MAP, and why it isn't
important.
If the person is bothered by Participation, I'd tell hir about SMDTR.
If the person wants a full-rankings method, I'd tell hir about MDDA and
MMD,ABucklin.
...but if that person didn't like Participation-faillure, then the only rank
method I'd
ask about would be ABucklin.
>From the above, I'd find out which of these methods the person would support.
Proposing:
The polling would give a good idea of what people would like.
But I'd mention the methods, their advantages and criticisms, to people. as
above, when
proposing methods to an electoral reform committee, small parties or political
organizations.
MCA can be defined slightly more briefly than MTA. MCA most likely would be the
most popular
proposal, among those listed above. But I'd ask about MDDTR, because of its
success in the ABE.
When giving up 1C and 3P, MDDTR gives up a lot of majority rule protection. But
it retains SFC
as is majority rule protection guarantee. That's the price of protecting
similar but antagonistic
alternative factions against eachother (a protection that I term "babysitting").
ABE failure can be dealt with, of course. Say the method is Approval or MCA:
Say your alternative faction is evidently larger than the other one. Together
they are a majority, and
can beat the Republocrats.
Solution 1: Everyone is co-operative, and both factions approve eachother's
candidates. Good luck :-)
Solution 2: If there's an air of antagonism, jealousy, rivalry and
unco-operativeness (as I suspect there is), then tell the other faction, "We
obviously aren't naturally co-operative. But my faction is larger, and
therefore is more the rightful winner. It makes sense for both factions to come
together on our candidate. Therefore, we
will approve only our candidate. But if, in subsequent elections, your
candidate is bigger than ours, then we'll approve hir too."
Mike Ossipoff
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