(I'm going to try this with plain text instead of rich text.) Yes, I miss-stated about MDDTR. MDDTR doesn't count top + middle ratings. MDDTR counts top ratings. And, of course, contrary to what I said elsewhere in my posting,MDDTR elects the undisqualified candidate with the most top ratings, and doesn't look at whether someone gets top rating from a majority. But those errors of mine don't affect my Mono-Add-Plump scenario. It's possiblefor your plump vote to take away x's majority defeat disqualification. Andif x, now undisqualified, has more top ratings than your favorite, thens/he might take the win from your favorite. How could x have moretop ratings than your favorite, and still have a majority defeat before you arrive tovote? Voters' don't agree on whom to top-rate, and no candidate has very many top ratings. A relatively large number of people have middle or top rated a few other candidates,but not x, making a bare majority pairwise defeat against x, which ceases to exist when you arrive without voting those other candidates over x. _That_ is my MDDTR Mono-Add-Plump scenario. But my point was that the difference betweenmy scenario, in which the newly-undisqualified candidate wins by beating your favorite bysome higher vote-total (top-ratings total); and your scenario in which s/he beats your favorite bybeing the only undisqualified candidate, is an insignificant difference. Either way, you made your favorite lose by voting that you're indifferent between everyone other than your favorite You wrote: I look forward to seeing it (an example of how MDDTR fails Mono-Add-Plump other than as you showed it to). [endquote] Why?? As I said, I don't assert that MDDTR fails Mono-Add-Plump; I admit it. And I tell whyit isn't a genuine fault or wrong result. So, without knowing if I'm correct to do so, I'll concedethat MDDTR can't fail Mono-Add-Plump in any way other than the way in your example. By the way, I don't say that you're wrong, to value the criteria that you value. It's just that I value only criteria that have signfificant practical importance. To me, this subject isn't an aesthetic art or aesthetic game. It's about practical improvement, solving serious practical problems of voting. With completely different goals and purposes, it's hardly surprising that we use different criteria, leading to preference for different methods. I fully admit that MDDTR, MDDA and MDD,ABucklin can look unaesthetic from the Plurality-accustomed point of view.Likewise MMPO and every method that meets Condorcet's Criterion (And no, I'm not saying that MMPO meets Condorcet's Criterion). So, MDDTR, MDDA, MDD,Bucklin and MMPO could be "controversial" because they differ too much from Plurality. Such objections can be disposed of, as I have done in my previous postings. But nevertheless, maybe one wouldn't want to have to give opponents the opportunity to use such distractions. For one thing, opponents have more money to make their arguments than proponents have to answer the arguments. So maybe it would be better to not propose potentially controversial methods. That's why, when proposing voting reform to people lately, I've been proposing Approval, MCA, & MTA; and not MDDTR or MMPO. But I don't give up on MDDTR and MMPO. I merely would offer them when there's more time to discuss their differences from Plurality. It would be necessary to establish that people consider their FBC, LNHa and CD compliance to be more important thantheir non-resemblence to Plurality, before making a public proposal about them. People would have to be willing to genuinely break with the Plurality voting system and its results. The Approval bad-example is a genuine problem, and one that can and should be avoided if we're going to use a rank method (in which category I include 3-slot methods). Mike Ossipoff ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
