Kristofer:
I'd said:
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> Who is wronged in Kevin's MMPO bad-example?
> -------------------------------------------
>
> Yesterday I asked how bad C can be, in that example, if nearly all
> the A voters are indifferent between B and C, and the only one not
> indifferent prefers C to B.
>
> I'd like to additionally ask who is wronged in that example. Someone
> who is indifferent between the winner and the other top candidate?
> Hardly.
>
> Surely the "wrongness" of a result must be judged by whether or not
> someone is wronged by it.
>
> Kevin's MMPO bad-example, MDDTR's Mono-Add-Plump failure, are
> Plurality-prejudice aesthetic matters.
You replied:
If some candidate gets more first place votes than another candidate
gets any place votes, it seems only reasonable to not elect the latter.
Call it aesthetic if you want
[endquote]
Yes.
You continued:
, but anything that breaks it that
flagrantly will seem really unintuitive to the voters.
[endquote]
Perhaps, but, as I've pointed out, every rank method is going to act
counterintuitively
or unaesthetically sometimes. We don't choose a rank method for all-the-time
aesthetics.
We choose one for the _practical_ guarantees that it can offer. Ways that it can
ease voters' strategy dilemmas.
As tell you what I told Chris Benham: I'm not saying that you're wrong about the
criteria that you judge by. That's an individual matter. There's no reason why
we should all
have the same goals and purposes with voting systems.
I'm more interested in practical guarantees for the voter, to alleviate or avoid
defensive strategy dilemma. But I can't, and don't, criticize others for not
sharing
those same goals.
You continued:
So you ask who's wronged in the example. I would say that the combined
group of the A-first and B-first voters are wronged
[endquote]
But you know that won't do. You can't say that the A voters are wronged.
They're nearly all indifferent between
B and C (except for the one who prefers C to B). For the same reason, you can't
say that the B voters are wronged.
...by electing someone they like no less than the other candidate?
If the A voters aren't wronged, and the B voters aren't wronged, then certainly
the A and B voters are not wronged.
You wrote:
Pleasing the two A=C and
B=C voters is not worth 9999 votes.
[endquote]
I've emphasized that I don't justify MMPO's result by saying that it's for
those two voters. MMPO's rule's purpose is to meet
FBC, SFC or SFC3, Later-No-Harm, CD, and Mono-Add-Plump.
And the cost of those big advantages is...what? The election of someone that
over whom no one prefers anyone other than
their favorite?
Mike Ossipoff
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