Why ranked and not graded ballots? This method would be consistent with non-normalized ballots (with no top-ratings or no bottom-ratings) being strategically optimal in some cases, arguably in most real-world cases. As Balinski and Laraki argue, using commonly-understood ratings/grades is the only way to avoid having strategy be, not just a consideration in rating, but the only logically coherent one. And it's easier, cognitively, to separately rate each candidate on a meaningful scale than to sort them into a rank order.
Jameson 2011/11/20 C.Benham <[email protected]> > > Forest Simmons wrote (17 Nov 2011): > > MTA vs. MCA > > I like MTA better than MCA because in the case where they differ (two or > more > candidates with majorities of top preferences) the MCA decision is made > only by > the voters whose ballots already had the effect of getting the ”finalists” > into > the final round, while the MTA decision reaches for broader support. > Because of this, in MTA there is less incentive to top rate a lesser evil. > If > you don’t believe the fake polls about how hot the lesser evil is, you can > take > a wait and see attitude by voting her in the middle slot. If it turns out > that > she did end up as a finalist (against the greater evil) then your ballot > will > give her full support in the final round. > > <end Forest quote> > > I buy this. I agree that MTA is a bit better than MCA. Well done Mike. > > * Voters submit 3-slot ratings ballots, default rating is Bottom > signifying least > preferred and not approved. Top-rating signifies most preferred and > approved. > Middle-rating also signifies approval. > > If any candidates are Top-rated on more than half the ballots, elect the > one of > these with the most approval. > > Otherwise elect the most approved candidate.* > > A slight marketing problem could be that the difference between this and > MCA > (and also between those and a third possible similar method: the TR winner > wins if > s/he has majority approval, otherwise the most approved candidate wins) > could > to some members of the public appear to be quite arbitrary and unimportant. > > Also of course MTA is little bit more complex to count than MCA. But on > the positive > side, it has just occurred to me that it would work better than MCA > extended to using > 4-slot ballots (with as with 3 slots, any rating above the bottom-most > slot is interpreted > as approval). > > I suppose by the same reasoning we could improve ER-Bucklin(whole), which > has > been given the briefer and quite apt new name by Mike O. of "ABucklin". > > My stab at defining the so improved version: > > *Voters submit ranking ballots, equal-ranking and truncation allowed. > Ranked (i.e.not > truncated) candidates are considered to be approved. > > Rankings are interpreted as ratings thus: candidates ranked below no > others are in the top > ratings slot. Those with x candidates ranked above them are in (x-1)th. > ratings slot from > the top. (So A=B>D is interpreted as A and B in top slot, second-highest > slot empty, > D in third-highest slot). > > Say the ratings slots are labelled from highest (signifying most > preferred) down as alphabetical > grades A, B, C, D etc. > > If any candidates are graded A on more than half the ballots then elect > the most approved one > of these. > > Otherwise if any candidates are graded A or B on more than half the > ballots then elect the most > approved one of these. > > Otherwise if any candidates are graded A or B or C on more than half the > ballots then elect the > most approved one of these. > > Continue in this vein considering the next lowest grade each round until > there is a winner, or if > that fails then elect the most approved candidate.* > > I think IBIFA is still quite a lot better than any of these methods, but > it is more complicated. > IBIFA has a less strong truncation incentive and the IBIFA winner will > never be pairwise-beaten > by the winner of any of these methods. > > Chris Benham > > > > > > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info >
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