David L Wetzell wrote:


      The two major-party equilibrium would be centered around the de
facto center.


   But positioning yourself around the de facto center is dangerous in
   IRV. You might get center-squeezed unless either you or your voters
   start using strategic lesser-evil logic - the same sort of logic
   that IRV was supposed to free you from by "being impervious to
   spoilers".

dlw: the cost of campaigning in "less local" elections is high enuf that it's hard for a major party to get center-squeezed. And if such did happen, they could reposition to prevent it.

Yes, I said that parties or voters could escape this problem by repositioning, i.e. adopting strategic lesser-evil logic.

If the cost of campaigning is high enough that only the two major parties can play the game, then money (what you call $peech) will still have serious influence. You might say that this is counterbalanced by the more local elections, so that minor parties can grow into major ones and there will be different minor-to-major parties in each location -- but you still have to convince the more local divisions (counties, cities, etc) to use IRV, and so the same problem applies there.

Or in other words: if you're right and there are only two major parties on the national scene (and so no center-squeeze problem), there will still be a center-squeeze problem in, say, Burlington's mayoral elections. Either Burlington has only two major parties (but then where would your more-local accountability come from?) or it has multiple parties, each of which has its own mayoral candidate, and the centermost n of which will be susceptible to center squeeze.

You want local areas to support smaller parties so they can grow and challenge the major parties. Well, then the local environment must be conducive to growth. If the parties have to strategically balance IRV's center squeeze (which forces them towards the wings) against the voter support they get from moving closer to the center, that's not exactly conducive to such growth. Nor is it so if the voters have to keep the breakdown point of IRV (when minor becomes major) in mind when voting. Can the parties really be as flexible as you'd like when they're facing the additional constraint of having to walk that tightrope produced by the election method itself?

(It might well be that the nature of IRV, plus cost of campaigning means there could only be two national-level parties. I don't think cost of campaigning alone would force there to be only two national-level parties - e.g. France - but the answer to that question isn't critical to what I wrote above. I'm saying that even if we assume what you're saying, you get into trouble on a more local level.)

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