Forest--
Say it's like the ABE, except that there's one more candidate, D.
In the ABE, you were an A voter, but now, with D in the election, you like D
best,
with A your 2nd choice.
(Say all the A voters vote as you do)
The B voters, while willing to middle-rate A for a majority coalition, wouldn't
be willing to miiddle-rate D.
If you vote A & D together in 1st place, then your top-rating for D means that
{A,B} is no longer a winning set, because you vote D over B.
If you vote in that way, C wins.
But you can at least make A win, because the B voters are willing to
middle-rate A.
You can do that by top-rating only A. You can middle-rate D if you want to.
Then, {A,B} wins, and, in that set, A wins with the most top votes.
You can get your best possible outcome (the election of A) only by voting
someone over
your favorite.
Mike Ossipoff
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