On 12/19/2011 01:50 AM, [email protected] wrote:
Let M be the matrix whose row i column j element M(i,j) is the number
of ballots on which i is ranked strictly above j plus half the number
of ballots on which neither i nor j is ranked.
In particular, for each k the diagonal element M(k , k) is half the
number of ballots on which candidate k is unranked.
Now think of M as the payoff matrix for the row player in a zero sum
game.
Elect the candidate that would be chosen by the optimal strategy of
the row player.
[End of Method Definition]
Is that method strategy-proof? If not, is there any way to determine
whether a given stochastic method is strategy-proof or not? I know that
some are (such as Random Pair, for instance).
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