Forest--
You wrote:
Also, going back to what you metioned before about the value of showing support
for losers that you like
better than the winner (given they have the chance of the proverbial
snowflake), I think that this is perhaps
the main rationale for extending approval all of the way down to the candidate
most likely to win (and
include that candidate only if the runner up is below it). [That's another way
to state strategy A.]
[endquote]
Ok, sure, I understand the justification. To show support for candidates better
than the frontrunner
you're voting for, and who are unlikely to be a serious rival to hir,
one could approve all of the inbetween candidates better
than the frontrunner that one approves.
It comes down to a question of whether you want to show that support, or
whether you want to do _strictly_
instrumental voting, where you assume that even the non-frontrunner inbetween
candidates have a finite
chance of being a rival to a frontrunner.
So I don't disagree with strategy A--It's merely a question of whether one
wants to deal with the
inbetween candidates expressively or strictly instrumentally.
I think that the honest Approval strategy is a fascinating finding--Effective
score-voting in Approval,
without randomization. That means that score voting is especially easily
available in Approval. So,
having proposed Score-Voting, one could then point out that it can be easily
achieved with the more modestly-
demanding Approval balloting.
As for myself, in Score-Voting, I'd probably use non-extreme points assignments
only in two instances:
1. The excellent diplomatic ABE solution that you suggested for Score-Voting
2. When a candidate is about as bad as a candidate can be and still be barely
acceptable,
...and so I feel that it's questionable whether s/he deserves a full approval.
In an Approval election, I'd randomize in those instances....unless honest
Approval would work there too.
Honest Approval stratgegy is probably only for someone who wants to do score
voting for all the
candidates. Or maybe not. Maybe some intended maximum and minimum ratings
wouldn't interfere with
voting an honest Approval ballot. Then, honest Approval voting would avoid for
me, too, the task
of randomizing.
By the way, of course your Score-Voting ABE solution only works if it's known
how many votes A
and B, combined, are going to get. In a first election by Approval or Score,
that might not be known.
Then, maybe an A voter might have to just hold hir nose and fully approve B, to
keep C from wining.
Later, when the numbers are more predictable, the A voters could use your
Score/Approval ABE solution.
But that shows a big advantage of MMT, GMAT, MGMAT, MTAOC and MMABucklin
Mike Ossipoff
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
