I spoke of MTA (or MCA) &/or MABucklin as optional ways of voting in an
Approval election. I should add that,
not only can those forms of voting be optional, but the options, which I've
described, for giving or with-holding middle ratings can be
selectively applied, by a voter, to particular candidates.
When MMTA is voted in that way, with optional middle-rating with-holding to
particuilar candidates, the result is quite similar to
MTAOC.
By the way, though my description of MTAOC here was in the form of pseudocode,
a description of the options offered by
MTAOC, a description of how it is MTA with a conditionalilty option, is a lot
simpler to tell to someone. After all,
with, for example IRV, does FairVote have to depend on everyone reading,
understanding and liking the computer
program, or do they merely describe what the method does? Likewise STV and, in
fact, other PR procedures.
Therefore I don't rule out MTAOC, either as an option for use with MTA, or as a
freestanding method proposal.
I've been saying that MTA and MABucklin are compatible as options in an
Approval election. So let me say a little about
how that is so (or at least for ABucklin and MCA):
ABucklin, as you know, is stepwise Approval. MCA is 2-stage ABucklin.
Say, in an Approval election, with optional ABucklin voting, the sum of the
Approval votes and ABucklin's
first vote assignment give some candidates majorities.
Of course, as always in Approval, the biggest votegetter wins.
Then, by ABucklin's rules, the count is over. The winner is the majority
candidate with most votes.
ABucklin won't have a chance to give its 2nd round of vote-assignments, because
there will already
be a majority winner.
If, however, no one has a majority, then ABucklin can proceed till someone has
a majority, and is elected
by ABucklin's rules. --also in keeping with Approval's rules, because the
ABucklin ballots have added more
Approvals.
MCA is 2-stage ABucklin.
What about MTA's compatibility as an option in an Approval election?
It's probably somehow workable too--with MTA, and an MTA-like ABucklin
modification as options in an Approval election.
Of course, for Approval-election-option-compatibility, MCA and ABucklin have a
simplicity advantage.
Of course, all of the middle-rating-witholding standards that I've spoken of
could be used with MCA, MTA, or ABucklin,
resulting in such methods as MMTA, MABucklin, etc.
And, as I said, the voter could apply those middle-rating-witholding standards
optionally, individually, to various particular candidates,
too.
Mike Ossipoff
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