Kristofer:
First, let me agree that "not-valid" is only a subjective opinion. I was using
it as shorthand to mean
that I don't consider the objection to be important.
So I don't deny the subjective-only value of "not-valid" when I said it.
Of course I wasn't saying that we can't consider the A plumpers and B plumpers
as a
class. I merely meant that the bad-example isn't as bad.
I don't deny that, ideally, the winner really should be A or B. It would be
preferable.
A voters say: "I wanted my favorite to win!"
I reply: "You mean your favorite whom about half the voters consider no better
than the
candidate who won?"
I'm not saying that the A and B voters, as a class aren't wronged.
I'm saying, "How serious is it really,considering the above hypothetical
conversation?"
Let me put it differently:
I'm just not seeing the problem that you're seeing.
When I say "problem", I mean a strategy dilemma like the need for
favorite-burial, or the
co-operation/defection problem. When I speak of a "problem", I'm referring to a
genuine,
big, problem to voters. A practical problem. A problem that will keep the
electorate
from achieving the change that they want.
You haven't shown that Kevin's MMPO bad-example is a problem in that sense.
What I see in Kevin's MMPO bad-example is an un-plurality-like outcome. We want
results better than those of Plurality.
The more improvements we want over Plurality, the more our results might
sometimes depart
from what we're used to in Plurality. Especially if we're greedy for the
super-brief
definition of MMPO, or its great flexibility as a full-rankings method, or the
simplicity of only requiring unqualified unilateral support, and its better job
of
electing unfavorite CWs.
So, when asking for
so much, yes I admit that the method's results could depart from those of
Plurality so as
to bother people who are accustomed to Plurality.
MMPO and MDDTR get their advantages from their big departures from Plurality.
I don't deny that those departures from Plurality could cause a problem for a
public enactment
proposal. That's why I consider my conditional-middle-ratings proposals to be
better public
proposals.
Those proposals are extensions of Approval, which, itself, is a
freedom-extension of Plurality.
Plurality is points system that makes you give a point to one candidate, and
zero points to the rest. Approval gives you the
additional freedom to point-rate each candidate--one point or zero points.
MTA, MCA, MTAOC, MMT, MMTA, etc. are all extensions of Approval. Some of those
add conditionality.
(It could be optional). But the point is that the coalition that must be mutual
in MMT or MMTA, etc.,
doesn't even exist in Plurality. These methods aren't taking anything away from
what we now have.
They're merely adding benefits. Not taking anything away. Even when the
mutuality requirement is automatic
instead of optional.
But when it's optional, it's even less criticizable.
Someone on this list was terribly bothered by the mutuality-requirement,
referring to it as "sordid".
He'll think this is terribly sordid, but if a faction of voters want coalition
support for their
candidate, why would it be important to them that they not support that
coalition?
They want to not help the people whose help they need?
Oh what a cruel strategy-need to burden someone with! :-)
You said:
Saying "nonvalid" right out just seems to imply more than a mere
difference of points of view about what tradeoffs to make.
[endquote]
I agree. It was unfortunate wording. I meant "unimportant in my opinion".
Mike Ossipoff
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