2012/1/2 <[email protected]> > Mike wrote .. > > > > MMPO with symmetric completion at bottom, while avoiding Kevin's > > > bad-example, also sometimes loses > > > MMPO's ABE-success: > > > > > > 60: A>B > > > 55: B > > > 100: C > > > Forest replied > > > Here is the pairwise opposition matrix for MAMD: > > > > [[155, 110, 87.5], > > [105, 100, 115], > > [127.5, 100, 115]] . > > > > The max dissent against B is from the 110 A supporters. This is > > the minimum of > > the max dissents, since A has is disapproved by 155, and B has a > > complaint of > > 115 against C , not to mention the 115 disapproval against C. > > > > So yes, B wins. > > > > Of course, if the A faction knows that the B faction sincere order is > B>A>C, the 60 A>B voters can split > up to give > > 15 A > 45 A>B > > > Then if the B voters stubbornly bullet, C will win. > > But if as many (45) of them vote sincerely as the A voters, then A will > win. > > I think this is a pretty good resolution of the defection problem. >
I've certainly seen worse. But it requires some sophistication from some voters, and some good polling data. In the limit, it requires unrealistically-high levels of both. So I still say that SODA's resolution of the defection problem is clearly the best such resolution I know of. Jameson
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