Dave: Any proposal for federal elections would be thoroughly scrutinized and examined. Do you think that Burlington's demonstration of IRV's spoiler problem won't be found by those studying IRV's merit? dlw: You gotta find new material. [endquote] Most likely dlw doesn't know what he means by that either. Comedians and othershowmen must use original material. Regrettably, IRV's spoiler problem is still there,just like it was during the previoius many years when we tried to warn about it.It's old material. But it's currently a problem, as Burlington showed. So maybe the new materialthat's needed is a new voting system, instead of the old-material failure known as IRV. Dave says: It's called the problem of micronumerosity. Nonsense. That isn't a descriptive name. No doubt anything is called by different names bydifferent people. The problem referred to is best known, well known, as the spoiler problem, which is also an incomparably better descriptive (if less pretentious) term. Maybe IRV's spoiler problem is called "the problem of micronumerosity" by the same people (or person?) who use your other pretentiously pseudoscientific language. The use of "micronumerosity" reveals an ignorance of word-origin: The first part of it is Greek, and the last part of it is Latin. Dave says: Burlington VT is not the smoking gun. It's evidence that if we get perfectionistic Only an IRV-promoter thinks that it's "perfectionistic" to reject one of the two or three worstmethods, a method whose improvement over Plurality debatable, and miniscule at best. You could close your eyes and throw a dart at a bulletin-board with voting-system nameson it, and thereby pick a better one than IRV. The elegantly simple Approval is incomparably better than IRV, as judged by the propertiesvalued by most at EM, and most who look at voting systems. Preferring the much simpler Approval, to IRV, isn't perfectionism. Dave says: ...so the anti-reform types can play divide and conquer agianst us Conspiracy theory paranoia. Anti-reform types didn't "divide" the rest of us from IRV. IRV's ridiculous inadequacy accomplished that. Dave says: ...that they can barely repeal IRV before it gets traction. [endquote] As I said before, IRV never had "traction". What it has had is an expensive pushprovided by someone with a lot of money. Dave says: Like I wrote, the only way a non-CW can win w., [endquote] Wrong. Ever heard of the squeeze-effect? All it takes is for favoriteness to taper graduallyaway from a middle CW, and s/hell lose to flanking candidates receiving transfers cascadingin from the sides. Quite aside from that, with 3 candidates, there is one chance 3 that the middlecandidate will be the smallest of the 3. And for hir to be CW requires only thatneither of the extreme two has a majority. Dave is saying that IRV's spoiler problem can be avoided if the two biggest candidatesinsincerely change their positions to the median, CW, position. But doing so would violate their promises to the people and corporations that gave them their money. They can't justchange their positions that much. Aside from that, and maybe this wouldn't occur to Dave, but maybe it would be nice if some candidates espoused positions reflecting their own frank, honest and sincere beliefs and opinions--rather than insincerely "moving" to a position calculated to be more electorallysuccessful. There's no way I could answer this long post tonight. I'll answer the rest on another day. Jameson: A sincere CW, a Condorcet candidate, can't lose in a runoff. Therefore, s/he can't loseif s/he is one of the two biggest votegetters in the primary. IRV doesn't have a guarantee like that. The conditional methods that I've been proposing won't elect "weak CWs", unfavorite CWs. >Anyway, that whole argument just leaves IRV, MJ, and SODA as viable. What?? :-) IRV's viabillty is in the sewer, after Burlington. In my conversations with people, SODAhas been rejected for complexity, and because it's such a big departure from the usualpractice of letting the ballots, and only the ballots, decide the election. You're all worried about what the incumbants will like or accept. They'll only accept what will keep electing them. They were elected by a method with a serious spoiler problem. Without that problem, and voters' consequent favorite-burial, those people wouldn't be in office. Theyknow that. Give them a little credit. If you want something that our current inumbants will like, then my advice to you is to stick with Plurality and IRV, because those are the methods that will artificially preserve two-party domination. It was shown by Myerson & Weber that Plurality and IRV will keep on electing even the two most despised parties, if media have led people to believe that those are "the 2 choices".That's because, after everyone has voted for those parties, (surprise) one of them will win, seeming to confirm the belief that they're "the 2 choices". Of course we're familiar with this in Plurality. But Myerson & Weber demonstrated that it'strue of IRV too. Initiaitives can win without any help from incumbants. It would be nice if incumbants wouldsupport methods that would end their careers, but don't count on it. Mike Ossipoff IRV is if the two biggest parties do not center themselves around the center. This possibility is what will goad them to recenter themselves more often. That is what would have happened in Burlington if the anti-IRV campaign had not succeeded. > > Over the decades, when confronted with IRV's spoiler problem, the IRV > promoters always insisted that it's just "theoretical". > I believe non-monotonicity is theoretical, because it presumes that a significant fraction of the population has a total change of heart as to who to vote for. It doesn't have the Weak Condorcet Winner problem, which means the CW doesn't always win and when that happens, it can get spun to bring back a more illiberal election rule. > > if complete results were > always available from IRV elections, the spoiler problem would be found to > happen in other instances as well. > The issue is how much and how bad is the numero dos candidate relative to the CW. The Vermont Prog candidate wasn't that far off from the center... > > (We should be contacting IRV opposition in the cities using it or > considering it, to suggest that they insist that complete > election results be divulged after IRV elections. Maybe letters to the > editor to papers in those cities too.) > > Though I've heard some IRV-promoter rhetoric about it, I haven't heard an > IRV-promoter's explanation for how that "theoretical" > problem actually happened, and an explanation for how he can still claim > that IRV's spoiler problem is only theoretical. > You have to sort thru what's being discussed. Nonmonotonicity is theoretical, as in sour grapes "if only if..." As for "spoiling", IRV reduces its likelihood of happening. It can only happen if there are three relatively big parties and the two biggest are not centered around the center and the supporters of the party-off center don't read the writing on the wall and strategically support the more centrist party. > > JQ:It's obvious that Burlington was a serious failure for IRV. It did not > live up to the advantages promoters had claimed for it. dlw: Their simplified marketing pitch wisely did not go into these sort of relatively unlikely outcomes and they froze the message to being about IRV vs a return to the status quo, as is also wise in an election campaign, as opposed to an electoral methods listserve. > > JQ: However, I have heard IRV supporters claim that Burlington was not a > total failure, because the results were better than plurality, assuming > that same set of (presumably mostly honest) ballots. I've also heard them > claim that Approval would have gotten the same results as plurality, due to > (my words) the Chicken dilemma. I disagree with both of these ideas, but I > can't trivially refute them. > > That said, I agree that it's hard to imagine voters going for IRV > nationally after Burlington. Even the arguments above amount to "it wasn't > TOO bad", which is not exactly inspiring. > I've no doubt that Burlington wd continue to get spun against IRV. The point is the dynamics. Instead of two major parties tilting too far off center, as has been the case, we'd have two major parties that'd need to adjust to the moving center far more often. But it's inane to think that a particular third party is going to be able to get as strong as the Prog party of VT in Burlington at the Nat'l level w.o. getting coopted by the major parties, jealous to keep their duopoly positions. So the chances of this happening are nil in prez elections. The problem with IRV in such elections wd be vote-counting and that is fixed by IRV3/AV3.... > > Honestly, this is part of why I keep pushing SODA. I think that incumbents > are used to balancing the dynamic tension of playing to their base or > playing to the center. I think that a system which radically upsets that > balance in favor of centrists is very scary to them, as well as to partisan > activists. I think that Condorcet actually does upset the balance in this > way; and that Range and Approval arguably do, at least enough to wake > those fears. I think that this fear has various facets; it's the real > "meat" behind the LNH argument, and I've also talked about it as the "weak > CW problem". It's perfectly reasonable not to want a dark-horse CW to win > if they couldn't in fact survive the scrutiny of a runoff; and even if it > weren't reasonable, any incumbent would hate having to worry about that > happening. > > Anyway, that whole argument leaves just IRV, MJ, and SODA as viable. IRV, > I agree, is a dead end, with numerous serious problems. So the question for > me is, is MJ or SODA more likely to pass in the US? Right now, I believe > that the answer is SODA, but I'm not really sure. > dlw: What about IRV3/AV3? Like I said above, it's not easy for a third party to get as strong as VT Prog was in Burlington at the state or nat'l level... and the dynamics wd be towards a change in the nature of the two major parties more so than the continuation of a competitive 3-way election.... > > (Again, I will strongly support Approval, Range, or Condorcet. I'm not > saying this argument makes them bad. I'm saying it makes them less viable > because incumbents and partisans, probably the two most-politically-active > groups there are, would both be very wary of them for these reasons.) > It's nice to see a little more realism on the list-serve. dlw > > Jameson > > > > 2012/1/20 MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com> > >> The discussion about IRV referred to something like P(IRV) and P(other), >> where those presumably represent the probability of >> success of IRV vs that of other methods. >> >> Burlington should show you that the probability of IRV ever making it to >> federal use is zero. I mean, can you be serious? Any proposal >> for federal elections would be thoroughly scrutinized and examined. Do >> you think that Burlington's demonstration of IRV's spoiler >> problem won't be found by those studying IRV's merit? >> >> Over the decades, when confronted with IRV's spoiler problem, the IRV >> promoters always insisted that it's just "theoretical". >> >> But now it can no longer be said to be only theoretical, because it has >> happened. In fact, most likely, if complete results were >> always available from IRV elections, the spoiler problem would be found >> to happen in other instances as well. >> >> (We should be contacting IRV opposition in the cities using it or >> considering it, to suggest that they insist that complete >> election results be divulged after IRV elections. Maybe letters to the >> editor to papers in those cities too.) >> >> Though I've heard some IRV-promoter rhetoric about it, I haven't heard an >> IRV-promoter's explanation for how that "theoretical" >> problem actually happened, and an explanation for how he can still claim >> that IRV's spoiler problem is only theoretical. >> >> David was using "x" to mean "merit" or something like that, when he spoke >> of x(IRV). Regarding IRV's merit, see above. >> >> Mike Ossipoff >> >> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> >> > > _______________________________________________ > Election-Methods mailing list > Election-Methods at lists.electorama.com > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... 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