Jameson,
You're not missing anything. You are right. Thanks for pointing that out.
I should have thought more about those methods before suggesting them. I
withdraw those suggestions.
I still stand by APPMM as a good criterion. But the set can't be a component
of a method algorithm that
meets the FBC.
Chris Benham
________________________________
From: Jameson Quinn <[email protected]>
To: C.Benham <[email protected]>
Cc: em <[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, 25 January 2012 5:11 AM
Subject: Re: [EM] Two more 3-slot FBC/ABE solutions
In fact, that would seem to be a pretty strong argument that these methods
don't meet the FBC. What am I missing?
2012/1/24 Jameson Quinn <[email protected]>
The problem with these methods is that you can't afford to vote for the
marginal candidate whom only you have heard of, because that candidate will not
be part of any S, and so your ballot will count against any S, even an S that
you otherwise like.
>
>Jameson
>
>
>2012/1/24 C.Benham <[email protected]>
>
>
>Following on from my recent definition of the APPMM criterion/set, I'd like
>to propose two not bad 3-slot methods that meet the FBC..
>>
>>Recall that I defined the APPMM criterion thus:
>>
>>
>>*If the number of ballots on which some set S of candidates is voted strictly
>>above all the candidates outside S is greater than the number of ballots on
>>which any outside-S candidate is voted strictly above any member of S, then
>>the winner must come from S.*
>>>
>>
>>The APPMM set is the set of candidates not disqualified by the APPMM
>>criterion.
>>
>>APMM//TR:
>>
>>* Voters fill out 3-slot ratings ballots. Default rating is Bottom
>>(signifying least preferred and not approved.) The other slots are Top
>>(signifying most preferred) and Middle.
>>
>>From the set of candidates not disqualified by the APPMM criterion, elect the
>>one with the most Top ratings.*
>>
>>
>>APMM//CR:
>>
>>* Voters fill out 3-slot ratings ballots. Default rating is Bottom
>>(signifying least preferred and not approved.) The other slots are Top
>>(signifying most preferred) and Middle.
>>
>>From the set of candidates not disqualified by the APPMM criterion, elect the
>>one with the highest Top minus Bottom ratings score.*
>>
>>
>>So far I can't see that these are technically any better than my earlier
>>suggestion of TTPBA//TR, and unlike that method they fail the "Tied at the
>>Top Pairwise Beats All" criterion.
>>
>>But like that method they meet the Plurality and Mono-add-Plump criteria,
>>and also have no problem with Kevin's bad MMPO example.
>>
>>I'm happy for APMM//CR to be also called APMM//Range. This method is more
>>Condorcetish than APMM//TR, for example:
>>
>>49: C>B
>>27: A>B
>>24: B>A
>>
>>B>A 73-27, B>C 51-49, A>C 51-49.
>>
>>APMM//TR elects A, while APMM//CR elects B (like TTPBA//TR).
>>
>>I am sure that APMM//TR has no defection incentive in the "Approval Bad
>>Example", and the other method also does in the example normally given.
>>
>>Of course some other points-score scheme (perhaps giving greater weight to to
>>Top Ratings) is possible.
>>
>>Chris Benham
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>
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