2012/1/30 MIKE OSSIPOFF <[email protected]> > > Hi Kevin-- > > You wrote: > > In my simulations MJ and Bucklinesque methods usually show similar strategy > patterns to Approval. (Though so > does Range.) > > [endquote] > > Yes. And so there's no justification for MJ's greater elaborateness, if it > doesn't get get rid of strategies > possessed by much simpler methods. > > Better expressivity than approval, which allows a naive voter to vote with less strategic-style thinking.
Less strategic impulse than Range. Shares the rated advantages - including IIA, etc. These are the justifications. > The conditional methods, offerable as voting-options in Approval election, do > much to alleviate the > > problem of help for a lower choice hurting your favorite. > > You wrote: > > If you go lower in the rankings (e.g. consider safety of 2nd preference from > the specified 3rd preference) I think > the numbers just get more and more unclear as to whether you stand to gain > anything for the risk you definitely > take. > > [endquote] > > Yes, things get more doubtful and uncertain lower in a ranking. > > For one thing, in a 3-slot method, if you're a progressive, then you might > feel safe in the belief that no progressive will > > middle-rate a Republican, though many might (at first) middle-rate one or > more Democrats. You might also feel safe in assuming > that Democrat top-raters won't middle rate Republicans. They consider the > Republicans to the main thing they need to defeat. > > (Sure, the Democrat and Republican candidates are really so policy-identical > that one would expect a top-rater of one to like > the other too, but I feel that most or all Democrat voters don't really like > the Democrat policies best. I believe that most or > > all Democrat voters are really progressives who feel that they need to > strategically give it to the Democrats) > > Knowing those things in a 3-slot election gives some sureness to the > protection and enforcement of majority rule. > > In ABucklin, with unlimited rank positions, at lower rank positions, you > can't really expect to guess reliably at what > point a group of voters will refuse to rank less-liked candidates, and so you > don't have the assurances that > > you'd have in a 3-slot method. Not unless there is some explicit organizing > for co-operation among factions. > > For that reason, I said earlier that I'd only advocate AOCBucklin if AERLO is > available. > > > So, now that I won't propose AERLO, then I probably won't propose AOCBucklin > (or ABucklin or Bucklin either, of course) either. > > Mike Ossipoff > > > > By the way, I agree that AERLO methods probably violate FBC. The effects are > too unpredictable. > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > >
---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
