On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 12:21 PM, Jameson Quinn <[email protected]>wrote:
> > > 2012/2/2 David L Wetzell <[email protected]> > >> >> >> On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 11:43 AM, Jameson Quinn >> <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> 2012/2/2 David L Wetzell <[email protected]> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> 2012/2/2 Stephen Unger <[email protected]> >>>>> >>>>>> A fundamental problem with all these fancy schemes is vote >>>>>> tabulation. All but approval are sufficiently complex to make manual >>>>>> processing messy, to the point where even checking the reported >>>>>> results of a small fraction of the precincts becomes a cumbersome, >>>>>> costly operation. (Score/range voting might be workable). Note that, >>>>>> even with plurality voting, manual recounts are rare. With any of the >>>>>> other schemes we would be committed to faith-based elections. >>>>>> >>>>>> Steve >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> I wanted to mention that Approval-voting enhanced IRV and STV could be >>>> tabulated at the precinct level. You let everyone rank up to 3 candidates >>>> and then you use these rankings to get 3 finalists. You then sort the >>>> votes into ten possible ways people could rank the 3 finalists. But if the >>>> third or fourth most often ranked candidates were within a small percent of >>>> each other then it would not require a manual recount. The IRV cd be done >>>> with two sets of 3 candidates so there'd be twice as much sorting in the >>>> 2nd round and then there'd be a manual recount if and only if there's a >>>> different outcome in the two sets of candidates, which is not likely. >>>> >>> >>> This is indeed possible, but it's several times harder than counting a >>> truly summable method, especially an O(N) summable one. >>> >> >> Explain to me what you mean by that? >> >> The summing of rankings in the first stage is O(N), right? >> The summing of the number of votes in each of the 10 categories is O(N), >> right? >> > > Yes. You can either do it in two rounds, or one round that's O(N^3). > Either way, it's more than twice as hard as a one-round, O(N) count. > It's not twice as hard. You just need to tally things up twice. That's small potatoes. > > >> The rest is a simple EXCEL spreadsheet problem. >>> >> >> >>> And it's the only advantage of IRV3/AV3, because center >>> squeeze/nonmonotonicity/Burlington still applies at full force >>> >> >> Unless, their full force isn't that strong in real life with a dynamic >> center and regular repositioning by parties. And a 20% chance of "sour >> grapes" non-monotonicity in the infrequent case of a three-way competitive >> race isn't enuf to change voter behavior significantly. And once again, >> Burlington has gotta be downscaled in its significance given the small >> margin with which IRV was rescinded and the deceptive campaign waged >> against it, and the likelihood that it's pathologies would have been easily >> worked out with time... >> >> Earth to EM, Burlington is not a smoking gun... >> > > Earth to David. Reality doesn't care how often you repeat nice-sounding > phrases about how you think IRV would usually work. Unless you give reality > a chance to change you're mind, you're just fooling yourself. > I do change my mind. The fact I haven't wrt IRV is because I got a good case and it is a huge non sequitur to presume that "the" solution to the US's political problems is for it to become an EU-style multi-party system.... Didn't you read RBJ's rebuke to your over-the-top rhetoric wrt IRV??? Y'all are trying to justify the large amount of time spent playing with complicated single-winner election rules when the truth is that such is not a pressing question for US_American electoral reform. dlw > > Jameson > >> dlw >> >>> >>> Jameson >>> >>>> >>>> dlw >>>> >>>> ---- >>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list >>>> info >>>> >>>> >>> >> >
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