On Fri, Feb 3, 2012 at 5:00 AM, Jameson Quinn <[email protected]>wrote:
> I consider the whole "encourages big parties to follow the moving center" > thing to be so ridiculous as not to bear argument, given that, as DSH > points out, the center is one of the worst places to be in IRV. I said "follow" and I presume that one cannot pinpoint the center... In my heuristic, we get to see the numbers, but the parties don't. They can choose direction and to move a little or a relatively lot, but they cannot stake any point, cuz it will change. > Sure, it does a better job than plurality. But if you want a system which > preserves two parties but makes them track the center, and you think that > US exceptionalism means this is a two-party nation by nature, then you have > a great array of systems which will accomplish your goal, and IRV is not > one of them. Now, who is being ridiculous? My whole point is that it's much more important to push for the strategic use of multi-winner elections in part of the US's system, rather than chase our tails around trying to figure out the best single-winner election rule. You all cannot agree. I think it's because in fact the diffs aren't that great and there's no good reason that IRV can't be immunized from a Burlington-like reversal. dlw > > Jameson > > 2012/2/2 David L Wetzell <[email protected]> > >> >> http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7696446405100112491&postID=7962761243854932802 >> >> Dale Sheldon Hess has provoked me to explain my views about IRV wrt to a >> 1-d politics game. >> >> Here's what I wrote, >> DSH:"Place a party directly in the center. Now, if I can place two more >> parties, I can always make your centrist lose. ALWAYS. And you can't move >> more-centrally to do anything about it (I can actually make it so that you >> can still win by moving AWAY from the center; how's that for perverse >> incentives!)" >> >> dlw: Ah, but in this example, the two biggest parties are in fact close >> to the center(as I predicted)... and so the fact that the most centrist >> party doesn't win is relatively small potatoes. >> >> And as for the 3rd party candidate winning by going way from the center, >> that's a curiosity due to the uniform dist'n of voter preferences. That >> isn't realistic... >> >> I've played with Yee's voteline thingy. The issue is with the uncertainty >> as to what is the center, since it's something that's dynamic. >> >> That's why I downplay the import of "center squeeze". The center can't be >> cordoned off by anyone and so to pick a rule based on how it pins down the >> center is like chasing after the wind. >> >> With both IRV and FPP, there's pressure to move twds the center by the >> biggest parties, it's stronger with IRV. Thus, the de facto center ends up >> becoming more closely tied to the true center. >> >> Let's say a shift in voter preferences has D and R at the 70 and 71 penny >> marks and G sets up shop at 35. G wd win with both FPP and IRV, but both D >> and R get to move again. But there are rigidities that prevent them from >> moving too much too fast. And so the D's move to 55 and the R's to 56. And >> then G still wins if it's FPP, but with IRV then R wins. >> >> But what if D moves and R (perhaps stuck in FPP thinking) doesn't move, >> so the positions are 35, 55 and 70? In that case, G would win. >> Tragedy, right? But it can be expected that the next election will change >> things further so that the G's must move to the right(or merge w. the Ds) >> and the R must move to the L or merge with the Ds. >> >> The moral of the story is that parties are like the people groping around >> in the dark in Socrates' cave. They cannot choose exactly where on the >> spectrum they will be. But IRV helps us to adjust and makes the outcome >> closer to the center than o.w. with FPP. >> >> If Approval Voting had been used then D would have won by moving to 64. >> In fact all the parties wd be strongly encouraged to beeline for whatever >> the center seemed to be and with a shifting center, they'd all stumble and >> bump together in the dark. >> >> Whereas, the Gs by taking a stand at 35 at least they succeed in moving >> things to the left or maybe they'll get lucky... >> >> It's not an exact science, which is what it should be. We want people to >> pursue the center, but not too doggedly... >> >> Sorry if that's fuzzy, but I think that's closer to real life... >> >> dlw >> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> >> >
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