2012/2/3 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[email protected]> > On 02/03/2012 02:26 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> Of course, in most real-world elections I've ever heard of, 4 candidates >> are plenty. So is there a way to fix SODA to make those pesky >> 5-candidate scenarios go away? Analogously, Condorcet's paradox arises >> for 3 or more candidates, but you can make 3 candidates paradox-free if >> you require a 2/3 supermajority, and continue to etcetera with an >> arbitrarily high supermajority. >> > > I thought 2/3 supermajorities always were transitive. How would you make a > supermajority cycle with many candidates? >
oops, you're right. One possibility would be for predeclared candidate preferences to be a >> single approval ballot, rather than a preference ordering. That way, in >> the scenario described above the delegator candidates could not disagree >> on the order of preference of the target candidates. This would actually >> simplify SODA rather than complicating it. >> > > Could you use a rated method instead of a ranked one for the candidate > delegation orders? > Looked at that. Doesn't work. Looking at the predeclare-approval idea... I think that if you assume that there are three known candidates who, between them, get delegated votes from over 75% of the electorate, and that these candidates predeclare before the others, then I think that there may be a "correct strategy" for all candidates for turning a preference order into predeclared preference order. So basically, for up to 4 effective candidates, it would works without a voodoo dependence on Sicilian candidate strategy in predeclaring the approval ballots. Jameson
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