2012/2/3 MIKE OSSIPOFF <[email protected]> > *I'd said: > > ***>* But I'd told how easily a strategic faction can take advantage of and > beat*>* a sincere-voting faction.*>** > Not to my satisfaction. > > [endquote] > > Of course that won't do. > > If you want to claim that my statements referred to were incorrect, > then you need to tell why you think so. > > Please repeat them then. (Doing so in the first place would have saved us both time.)
> > I clearly told how, in MJ, a strategizing faction can take advantage of a > sincere faction. Which > part of that description do you disagree with? Be specific. > * > I'd said: > > ***>* Thanks, Kristofer, for confirming my conjecture: MJ strategy is like > RV*>* strategy.*>**>* This is for sure: In a u/a election, MJ's strategy is > the same as that of*>* RV: Max-rate the acceptables and*>* min-rate the > unacceptables.*>** > This is not true. If sending a message about the relative value within > either group is worth more than a thousand times less than winning the > election, the rational strategy is to use the top two and the bottom two > ratings. > > [endquote] > > Incorrect. In a u/a election, the all-important thing is ensuring that no > unacceptable candidate wins. > **>* I conjecture that, in a non-u/a, 0-info election, MJ's strategy is*>* > likewise identical to that of RV: Max-rate the*>* above-mean candidates and > min-rate the below-mean candidates.*** > As above. > > [endquote] > > Strategy whose purpose is the the outcome of the current election is called > "instrumental strategy". > > It's usually or always what we're referring to when we speak of a method's > voting strategy. > > I was talking about instrumental strategy. That can be, and often is, more > important than > sending a message. But sure, if what you want is to send a message about a > merit-difference among the > candidates for whom you'd vote for in instrumental Approval voting, then of > course you might not do > > instrumental voting. > > We're humans, not robots. We always have both short-term instrumental and long-term instrumental (which you mistakenly call non-instrumental) goals. I agree that usually the former dominate. But in MJ, unless they around a thousand times stronger, they do not lead to the strategy you posit. > > Sometimes, in mock elections, in rating the candidates, > I have slightly differed from instrumental voting in order to express a > difference. > > But, above, I was talking about instrumental strategy. Maybe you wouldn't do > instrumental > strategy. One thing for certain is that anyone who considers it a u/a > election will do > instrumental strategy. > > Mike Ossipoff > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > >
---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
