Please, stop talking, and start calculating. If you're not ready to calculate, then at least stop arguing with us, and start arguing with the fuzzy beast, until you are.
Jameson 2012/2/3 David L Wetzell <[email protected]> > dlw: When you try out a new piece of technology, you can't expect to get >>> it right right away. A democracy is a function of both the rules and >>> people's habits. If GOPers had seen that their party couldn't win then >>> some of them wd've voted Dem first and the CW wd have won.... >>> >> >> David! That's the point! That's the problem! IRV promised that you >> could vote for your favorite candidate and that would not help elect your >> least favorite. > > > dlw: They promised it to those who had to vote strategically way too often > with FPTP. They did not promise it was always true. > > >> it explicitly failed to do that on the second try. In this town that, at >> least 3 years ago, had 3 major parties (so the spoiler wasn't some kinda >> Ron Paul or Ralph Nader gadfly who had no hope of election but could still >> rob victory from the majority candidate). In the context where the 3 (or >> more) candidates are *all* plausible, Condorcet would have elected a >> candidate where, by definition, no other candidate was preferred over this >> CW and, at least in the Burlington 2009 example, would not have suffered >> spoiler, punishment for sincere voting, non-monotonicity, and >> non-summability/transparency. >> > > dlw: non-monotonicity is not at fault here, unless you expect a large no. > of GOP supporters to have a huge change of heart to support the Prog party > first....Neither was there a problem with summability/transparency... > > And how do you know there wouldn't be other foibles that emerge as folks > got adjusted to a Condorcet method? > > Perhaps the number of candidates would proliferate so much that it'd be a > vote-counting nightmare... > > At the end of the day, 3-way competitive elections for single-seat > positions are hard to sustain. IRV wd have made the parties around the > true center be the major parties. Now, it seems that won't be the case... > >> >> rbj: It *failed*, David. (but it still beats Plurality and, >> unfortunately the voters of Burlington, who adopted IRV by 65% in 2005, >> tossed the baby out with the bathwater in 2010 and *really* did in 2011 >> when they rejected the 50% threshold.) > > > dlw: Depends on your loss-function and whether you take a single-period or > multi-period assessment of the outcomes. > I refuse to accept a pass-fail assessment of IRV wrt Burlington. It's not > appropriate. It's playing into the hands of the opponents of electoral > reform by repeating their frames. > > >> rbj: now, elections are something that we (any particular group of >> people) do not do every day. it's not like you got your iPhone or iPad and >> it worked the day you bought it, and had trouble the second day, but you >> are willing to see how well it works the next day. it's more like a >> high-rise building technique or bridge-building technique (e.g. Tacoma >> Narrows Bridge). if you use some new technique and it fails the first time >> you use it, you better believe there will be hesitation and controversy the >> next time its use is proposed. and very similar if it happens the second >> use. >> > > It depends on the severity of the loss. You are exaggerating the > practical bads of the election of a non-CW somewhat left of the CW. > Micronumerosity says we got to not draw strong conclusions from very > limited use of something new. It tells us we need to turn away from our > fallen human natures driven by our fears. > >> >> rbj: on the other hand, if the technique was used 50 times before it >> failed, you would more likely look at the failure as a fluke or outlier. >> elections happen once or twice a year (if you're politically active, if >> you're not it's more like once in four years) and their consequences are >> significant, in some cases worse than a building collapse. >> > > dlw: Once again, assess the "damage" and take the longer view of how this > will play into the next election. If IRV had been continued the Prog > candidate wd have moved to the right some to woo Democrats so the outcome > wd have been preferred by most people. > > "a failure that occurs so soon after adoption might very well be an > indication of something systemic, not just an outlier." > > dlw: It ain't necessarily so... and you got to consider the relative > import of type one vs type two errors. A sample of type 2 is not going to > be powerful and when you try to make it powerful, you increase the > likelihood of a type one error, ending the use of a good election rule > before it had a chance to prove itself among a populace that understands it > better. > >> >>> dlw:To prevent all tactical voting is not the greatest good. >>> >> >> The *primary* reason for adopting ranked-choice voting, the greatest good >> promised, is to remove the *burden* of tactical voting from voters so that >> they do not experience voter's regret the day after the election (which, >> here in Burlington, soured many voters that do not return to the polls, >> thus reducing participation in democracy). i don't suggest that we can >> prevent all tactical voting, but the common burden of tactical voting, the >> tactic called "compromising", is avoidable and *should* be avoided where at >> all possible. >> > > Think about it. Really? Preventing anyone from being pressured to > tactical voting is the greatest good? Shouldn't it be to make the parties > responsive to the general views of the population? To reduce the distance > between the de facto and true political center? > > I don't have a problem if a major party chooses to get ideologically stuck > so some of its supporters have to abandon it because of its > non-electability. > > In our context where $peech is so strong the "tactical voters" are more > likely to be the ones who've been gaming the system for their own bottom > line for quite some time. It isn't the same thing for them to be pressured > to vote insincerely as it is when third party dissenters from "dumb and > dumber" get pressured to vote that way. The former bonds the de facto and > true center. The latter severs the two. > > > dlw > >> >> > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > >
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