> > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Kevin Venzke <[email protected]> > To: election-methods <[email protected]> > Cc: > Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2012 22:37:56 +0000 (GMT) > Subject: Re: [EM] Kevin V > Hi David, > > > *De :* David L Wetzell <[email protected]> > *À :* [email protected]; EM <[email protected]> > *Envoyé le :* Mardi 7 février 2012 16h17 > *Objet :* Re: Kevin V > > dlw: I argue that the strength of the US presidency and regular > presidential elections has the effect of building up our two-party system. > This is why I take as a given that there tend to be 2 bigger major parties > and not as many serious candidates in "single-winner elections". This in > turn tends to > reduce the import of the diffs among the wide variety of single-winner > elections. > > > I think it works like this: > President isn't responsible to or chosen by Congress -> > There is not that much prize for having a majority of a house -> > Weak party discipline (because of less focus on party: a candidate can get > reelected even if his peers are unhappy) -> > If you are a viable candidate, there is no need for you to carve out a new > party. There is only room for two contenders per > race (under FPP), and there are two parties that will take you as long > as you can win for them. > > dlw: Aye, but the prez election itself and its potential for coat-tails > and the reward from capturing one or both of the US legislatures > does build up the parties who can afford to run a serious prez election > race. I think some of the weak party discipline is also due to the > restrictions on donations to parties in the 1974 FEC act. > Our system wd function better if there was more intra-party discipline and > the donations flowed thru the relatively transparent venue of the party. > > > > Personally I prefer weak party discipline. I like candidates to have > independence, with the decision-making power > less concentrated. And I'm suspicious of what party policies designed at > the national level would look like. >
dlw: Well, intra-party discipline is needed one way or the other to get things done. Our system right now is characterized as full of political entrepreneurship, which makes bills a lot more complicated than they need to be and things take longer and too much of politicians' time gets spent fund-raising... > > > > KV: I think we could have three "parties" (if not a much greater variety > of viewpoints) with the right method. I wouldn't care > if they are actually parties or just a higher number of real choices, on > average, in a race. > > dlw:Would it make a diff if our two major parties became two different > major parties, bridging the gap between the de facto center and the true > center? > If American forms of PR were adopted so that there'd still be 2 major > parties per area, they wouldn't be the same 2 parties for all regions, > which would then enable minor parties > to contest the duopoly. And if this got complemented by a host of > LTPs(with coalitions) that specialized in contesting "more local" > elections and voting strategically together in "less local" elections, > along with other acts that hold elected officials accountable to their > promises then we'd have better quality choices, even if the quantity is > less than we'd prefer. > > > Yes, I think it would be useful if we could increase the incentive to > stand at the median, even if two "parties" maintained > their grip on things. > > I don't find PR very interesting personally. It can be its own goal, but > it doesn't seem useful for the things I'm concerned > about. > dlw: For more local electyions that are rarely competitive, it's the only way to make them not DINOs. We used quasi-proportional elections for IL from 1870-1980 and it kept either major party from dominating the state's politics, so other states that are/were economically dependent on IL could afford to be more politically independent than if one party had been able to leverage their domination of IL's politics... It's a neglected part of our history!!! dlw > > Kevin > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Kevin Venzke <[email protected]> > To: election-methods <[email protected]> > Cc: > Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2012 22:53:34 +0000 (GMT) > Subject: Re: [EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking at Condorcet > Hi Robert, > > I would +1 to Bryan Mills' post. > > >in the two-candidate case, you would have to assume unequal treatment for > voters > > Yes, utility inherently does this. It's trying to maximize "happiness" > which is a different ideal from giving > everyone equal weight (e.g. even people who don't have a strong opinion). > > >but when Clay says that Score or Approval is better at picking the > Condorcet winner than is a > >Condorcet-compliant method, *that* is no tautology is obviously > controversial, since it says that there is > >a number closer to 3 than the number 3 itself. > > What Clay means is that score/Approval are better at picking the *sincere* > Condorcet winner. Yes, that's > obviously controversial. It could be true if it so happens that nobody > wants to vote truthfully under > Condorcet methods, while Approval in practice never has any bad outcomes, > etc. > > >if it isn't 0 (for when you don't get who you voted for) and 1 (for when > your candidate is elected), then > >some voter is diluting their utilities and i think it's pretty useless > and in bad taste to ask voters to do that > >explicitly with a Score ballot. > > "Utilities" refers to what voters actually "feel," not what they are > putting on the ballot. > > Kevin > > > _______________________________________________ > Election-Methods mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com > >
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