It is because first-mover counts a lot that we've been stuck with FPTP in the US for such a long time in contrast with countries with younger democracies...
I never said it was all that counts, but it counts a good deal, as I metaphorically allude to by emphing the diffs in Ps over the diffs in Xs for single-winner election rules. dlw On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 2:35 PM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.qu...@gmail.com>wrote: > If first-mover is all that counts, then I'm afraid we're stuck with > plurality. Obviously, I hope and believe that's not true. > > Jameson > > 2012/2/17 David L Wetzell <wetze...@gmail.com> > >> IRV's got a first mover advantage over SODA and to catch up you need to >> convince someone like Soros to help you market it. It wouldn't matter if >> you got the whole EM list to agree with you that it was hunky-dory. >> >> But in the context of a 2-party dominated system, there aren't as many >> serious candidates and so what relative advantages there are of SODA over >> IRV will be less, which then makes the first-mover marketing problem more >> significant, especially if IRV can be souped up with the seemingly slight >> modification of the use of a limited form of approval voting in the first >> stage. >> >> dlw >> >> On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 12:27 PM, < >> election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com> wrote: >> >>> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to >>> election-methods@lists.electorama.com >>> >>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >>> >>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com >>> >>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >>> election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com >>> >>> You can reach the person managing the list at >>> election-methods-ow...@lists.electorama.com >>> >>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >>> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..." >>> >>> Today's Topics: >>> >>> 1. Re: Real-world examples of chicken dilemma? >>> (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) >>> 2. STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (David L Wetzell) >>> 3. SODA arguments (Jameson Quinn) >>> 4. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (Jameson Quinn) >>> 5. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (James Gilmour) >>> 6. Re: Question about Schulze beatpath method (Markus Schulze) >>> >>> >>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>> From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_el...@lavabit.com> >>> To: Jameson Quinn <jameson.qu...@gmail.com> >>> Cc: EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com> >>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 07:51:10 +0100 >>> Subject: Re: [EM] Real-world examples of chicken dilemma? >>> On 02/15/2012 08:46 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: >>> >>>> As I've said before, I'm writing a paper on SODA and the chicken >>>> dilemma. I'd appreciate any real-world examples of the dilemma. >>>> Obviously, since a true chicken dilemma is not possible with either >>>> plurality, runoffs, or IRV, I'm looking for cases that arguably would >>>> have been a chicken dilemma under approval. That means that the two >>>> "vote splitting" factions would almost certainly have clearly preferred >>>> each other to the opposing faction, but there was still enough bad blood >>>> and a close enough balance that they could easily have failed to >>>> cooperate. I'd say HI-01-2010 qualifies as a good example; US-Pres-2000 >>>> doesn't, because many of the Nader voters affirmed that they would not >>>> have voted for Gore, and anyway, Gore won both the popular vote and the >>>> most self-consistent counts of Florida. >>>> >>> >>> Wouldn't the Burr dilemma count? That *was* Approval. Granted, it was >>> used to elect more than one candidate, but you could argue the property >>> would remain in a singlewinner context. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>> From: David L Wetzell <wetze...@gmail.com> >>> To: EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com> >>> Cc: >>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 08:49:08 -0600 >>> Subject: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? >>> It seems to me that a common sense solution would be to base which gets >>> used on the propensity for voters to be informed about the elections. >>> >>> Also, the two types seem to be bundled with different types of quotas. >>> STV gets marketed with the droop quota here in the US. I'm not >>> complaining because it's good to simplify things. But if STV were bundled >>> with Droop then 3-seat LR Hare might prove handy to make sure that 3rd >>> parties get a constructive role to play in US politics. >>> >>> So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota, perhaps using AV in a >>> first step to simplify and shorten the vote-counting and transferring >>> process, for US congressional elections or city council elections and >>> 3-seat LR Hare for state representative and aldermen elections. The latter >>> two elections are less important and get less media coverage and voter >>> attention. Is it reasonable to expect voters to rank multiple candidates >>> in an election where they often simply vote their party line? Why not keep >>> it simple and use the mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep the >>> system's duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly contested? >>> >>> It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked >>> choices or party-list PR. I think it is a matter of context and that both >>> can be useful, especially when no explicit party-list is required for a >>> 3-seat LR Hare election. The vice-candidates who would hold the extra >>> seats a party wins could either be selected after the victory or specified >>> before hand. >>> >>> So what do you think? >>> >>> I'm keeping the seat numbers down because I accept that those in power >>> aren't going to want an EU multi-party system and I'm not sure they're >>> wrong about that, plus the US is used to voting the candidate and having >>> their representative and they could keep that if there are relatively few >>> seats per election. >>> >>> dlw >>> >>> >>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>> From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.qu...@gmail.com> >>> To: EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com>, >>> electionsciencefoundation <electionscie...@googlegroups.com> >>> Cc: >>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 09:20:20 -0600 >>> Subject: [EM] SODA arguments >>> For those who feel that Bayesian Regret is the be-all-and-end-all >>> measure of voting system quality, that SODA's BR for 100% strategic voters >>> will beat all other systems, including Range/Approval. >>> >>> For those who feel that Condorcet compliance is the be-all-and-end-all, >>> a majority Condorcet winner, or any Condorcet winner with 3 candidates and >>> full candidate preferences, is not just the winner with honest votes, but >>> in all cases the strategically-forced winner; this contrasts with Condorcet >>> systems, in which strategy can cause even majority- or 3-candidate- CWs to >>> lose. >>> >>> For those who feel that strategic resistance is the most important, SODA >>> is unmatched. It meets FBC, solves the chicken dilemma, has no burial >>> incentive (ie, meets later-no-help), and even meets later-no-harm for the >>> two most-approved candidates (where it matters most). It's monotonic, and I >>> believe (haven't proven) that it meets consistency. It meets participation, >>> cloneproofness, and IIA for up to 4 candidates. >>> >>> For those "middlebrows" who most value a system's acceptability to >>> current incumbents, SODA is top-of-the-line. It allows voters to vote >>> plurality-style and, if two parties are clearly favored by voters, allows >>> those two parties to prevent a weak centrist from winning, even if >>> polarization is so high that the centrist is an apparent Condorcet winner. >>> >>> For those who want simplicity: while it's true that the SODA counting >>> process is more complicated than approval, the process of voting is >>> actually simpler than any other system, because you can just vote for your >>> favorite candidate. For the majority who agrees with their favorite >>> candidate's preferences, there is no strategic need to watch the polls and >>> figure out who the frontrunners are, and no nail-biting dilemma of whether >>> to rank others as equal to your favorite. >>> >>> And for those who balk at delegation, SODA allows any voter to cast a >>> direct, undelegated ballot; and allows those voters who do delegate to know >>> how their vote will be used. Refusing to consider SODA because you don't >>> want to delegate, is like refusing to walk into a candy store because you >>> don't like chocolate; SODA allows, not requires, delegation. >>> >>> I think pretty much everybody on this list falls into one or more of the >>> above categories. So, what's not to like about SODA? >>> >>> Jameson >>> >>> ps. I clarified the SODA >>> procedure<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SODA_voting_(Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval)#Full.2C_step-by-step_rules> >>> on >>> the wiki, though there were no substantive changes. I improved the >>> formatting, marked the steps which are optional, and better explained that >>> winning candidates use their delegated votes first because precisely >>> because they will probably choose not to approve others. >>> >>> Comments are welcome. >>> >>> >>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>> From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.qu...@gmail.com> >>> To: David L Wetzell <wetze...@gmail.com> >>> Cc: EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com> >>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 09:26:33 -0600 >>> Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? >>> >>>> >>>> It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked >>>> choices or party-list PR. >>>> >>> >>> I don't. I think that party-list removes voter freedom, and ranked >>> choices is too much of a burden on the voter. While either would be better >>> than what we have, I prefer to use delegation a la SODA. >>> >>> Thus my favored system is PAL >>> representation<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation>. >>> It's true that PAL still has some (very attenuated) party-list-like >>> aspects, because party affiliation is used to match candidates to districts >>> at the end; but if you were willing to give up this (overlapping) >>> geographical representation aspect of PAL, you could make a similar >>> delegated PR system in which parties played no explicit role. >>> >>> Jameson >>> >>> >>> >>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>> From: "James Gilmour" <jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk> >>> To: "'David L Wetzell'" <wetze...@gmail.com>, "'EM'" < >>> election-methods@lists.electorama.com> >>> Cc: >>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 18:01:55 -0000 >>> Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? >>> But why would you want all these differences and complications? >>> >>> If you are going to use STV-PR for some of these elections, why not use >>> STV-PR for all of these elections to the various >>> "representative assemblies" (councils, state legislatures, US House of >>> Representatives, US Senate). STV-PR works OK in both >>> partisan and non-partisan elections, so it should give fair and proper >>> representation of the VOTERS in all these different >>> elections. >>> >>> Of course, with districts returning only 3 to 5 members, the >>> proportionality and direct representation MAY be a little limited, but >>> if small numbers are needed to make the system acceptable to the vested >>> interests, then so be it. STV-PR with 3, 4 or 5 member >>> districts is greatly to be preferred to plurality in single-member >>> districts and to plurality at large. We had to accept local >>> government wards electing only 3 or 4 councillors as part of our STV-PR >>> package - that's practical politics. But that reform has >>> transformed our local government - no more "one-party states". >>> >>> James Gilmour >>> >>> >>> > -----Original Message----- >>> > From: election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com >>> > [mailto:election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com] On >>> > Behalf Of David L Wetzell >>> > Sent: Friday, February 17, 2012 2:49 PM >>> > To: EM >>> > Subject: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? >>> > >>> > >>> > It seems to me that a common sense solution would be to base >>> > which gets used on the propensity for voters to be informed >>> > about the elections. >>> > >>> > Also, the two types seem to be bundled with different types >>> > of quotas. STV gets marketed with the droop quota here in >>> > the US. I'm not complaining because it's good to simplify >>> > things. But if STV were bundled with Droop then 3-seat LR >>> > Hare might prove handy to make sure that 3rd parties get a >>> > constructive role to play in US politics. >>> > >>> > So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota, perhaps >>> > using AV in a first step to simplify and shorten the >>> > vote-counting and transferring process, for US congressional >>> > elections or city council elections and 3-seat LR Hare for >>> > state representative and aldermen elections. The latter two >>> > elections are less important and get less media coverage and >>> > voter attention. Is it reasonable to expect voters to rank >>> > multiple candidates in an election where they often simply >>> > vote their party line? Why not keep it simple and use the >>> > mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep the system's >>> > duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly contested? >>> > >>> > It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between >>> > ranked choices or party-list PR. I think it is a matter of >>> > context and that both can be useful, especially when no >>> > explicit party-list is required for a 3-seat LR Hare >>> > election. The vice-candidates who would hold the extra seats >>> > a party wins could either be selected after the victory or >>> > specified before hand. >>> > >>> > So what do you think? >>> > >>> > I'm keeping the seat numbers down because I accept that those >>> > in power aren't going to want an EU multi-party system and >>> > I'm not sure they're wrong about that, plus the US is used to >>> > voting the candidate and having their representative and they >>> > could keep that if there are relatively few seats per election. >>> > >>> > dlw >>> > >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>> From: "Markus Schulze" <markus.schu...@alumni.tu-berlin.de> >>> To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com >>> Cc: >>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 19:27:05 +0100 >>> Subject: Re: [EM] Question about Schulze beatpath method >>> Hallo, >>> >>> it can happen that the weakest link in the strongest path >>> from candidate A to candidate B and the weakest link in the >>> strongest path from candidate B to candidate A is the same link, >>> say CD. >>> >>> I recommend that, in this case, the link CD should be declared >>> "forbidden" and the strongest path from candidate A to candidate B >>> and the strongest path from candidate B to candidate A, that does >>> not contain a "forbidden" link, should be calculated. If again the >>> weakest link in the strongest path from candidate A to candidate B >>> and the weakest link in the strongest path from candidate B to >>> candidate A is the same link (say EF), then also this link should >>> be declared "forbidden" and the paths from A to B and from B to A >>> should be calculated. This should be repeated until the weakest >>> link in the strongest path from A to B and the weakest link in the >>> strongest path from B to A are different links. >>> >>> Markus Schulze >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Election-Methods mailing list >>> Election-Methods@lists.electorama.com >>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com >>> >>> >> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> >> >
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