The basic chicken dilemma is: 35 A>B 25 B>A 40 C This is, indeed, resolved by AOC. But what about: 39 A 39 B 22 C
If C voters AOC-approve A and B, then A and B are in a chicken-like position. Whichever one of them gives C more AOC approvals will win; but if they both give 20 or more, then C wins. I think that C winning in the normal chicken dilemma is at least a bit justifiable. C winning in this upside-down scenario is totally wrong. (In fact, you can have the same problem with A and B trying to free-ride on C with AOC in the standard chicken dilemma; but I doubt anti-C voters would be that sneaky.) Jameson
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