Abd: You are right that C will probably win the chicken dilemma Mike stated, where C has 49%, under almost any system except SODA. That's why I usually give a version of the dilemma where C has 40%, not 49%.
You are wrong that this is unrealistic. For instance, see Hawaii's 1st congressional district special election, 2010<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawaii's_1st_congressional_district_special_election,_2010>. I believe that chicken-like scenarios, while they will be a minority of elections, are certainly common enough to be worth worrying about; clearly more common, for instance, than honest Condorcet cycles. In the end, I do not believe that AOC conditionality really fixes the problem any more than Bucklin does. If C voters give conditional approvals to A and B, then A and B voters are again tempted to seek a leg up on the others by conditionally approving C, and again if both do so C wins. I doubt they'd be so shortsightedly partisan, though, just as I doubt it with Bucklin. There are only two ways I know of to truly fix this dilemma. One is as with IRV, to make it impossible for B to beat A (without favorite-betraying C votes). The problem is that this solution will always encourage such favorite betrayal; and also, if, unlike IRV, the scenario is recognized through A's second preferences instead of B's, such a solution would motivate burial; that is, even if A voters don't actually prefer B, they would pretend to to unfairly win the election. The other way is delegation, as with Asset or SODA. This has the (arguable) advantage that C can lose even with 49%. Still, as I said above, half-solutions like AOC or Bucklin may be enough if C has more like 40%; by merely making the slope down to a C win less slippery, such systems may avoid that outcome. Still, since AOC is not really better than Bucklin here, while it is clearly more complex, I think there's no reason to waste our breath on it. Jameson 2012/3/14 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[email protected]> > At 03:53 PM 3/14/2012, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote: > > > >I admit that that is a mess--when my >> >optional-conditionality-by-**mutuality algorithm definition >> >is in three widely-separated postings. At least I should re-post the >> >corrected pseudocode in >> >one posting. Should have already done that before now. Will within a few >> days. >> >> While there may be value for this in terms of working on improved >> methods, as to theory, as to possible public implementations, not >> method that is so complex to explain has a prayer of seeing >> application outside of specialized societies where they are willing >> to tolerate that. >> >> [endquote] >> >> How many people have seen, or asked to see, the computer program for >> vote-counting >> in our current elections? How many people in IRV jurisdictions have seen >> or asked to see, >> or understood the count program for IRV? >> > > Mike, that's irrelevant and you know it. People know how the vote will be > used to determine winners, with Plurality or Top Two Runoff. They may not > know every detail, but they would probably get it very close to correct. > (i.e, what is the basis for majority? Some might not get this right.) > > IRV has been explained, and most people, again, understand it if they are > paying attention. The rules can be simply stated. > > Some people don't care, for sure. But when a new voting system is > proposed, people will want to at least think they understand. They > certianly did not understand all the details when IRV was implemented in > San Francisco, the voter imformation pamphlet lied to them. That's a > different problem! > > > > People are told how IRV works, but they don't have to see the software. >> > > I wasn't asking for the software, I was asking for the rules which would > be used to create the software. The algorithm, if you will, and if an > algorithm is complex, the various implications of it will be even more > obscure. Mike, this is a political issue. Your method might be > theoretically superior, but as a first reform, forget about it. If public > process can be set up that, say, studies election method performance in > simulations, and if the recommendations of the committee formed are > trusted, maybe. But getting that is quite difficult, all by itself. > > > > AOC conditionality can be described in terms of what it does for the >> voter. >> >> A conditional approval isn't counted unless it is reciprocated. >> > > What that means isn't obvious. But I assume you'll explain: > > > It can be said in more detail, but a little more wordily: >> >> Call a ballot's unconditionally-approved candidates its "favorites". >> >> A ballot on which C is favorite is called a C-favorite ballot. >> > > You have not defined "unconditionally approved." How is that shown on the > ballot? I could guess, but I'd rather not! > > > For each pair of candidates, C and D, the number of ballots on which D, >> but not C is favorite, >> and which conditionally approve C must at least equal the number on which >> C, but not D is >> favorite, and which conditionally approve D. Otherwise enough >> C-but-not-D-favorite ballots' conditional >> approvals of D are ignored to achieve the above-described parity >> condition. >> > > Mike, most people's eyes will be glazed over at this point. I have a habit > of reading stuff like this with "stupid eyes." I cannot immediately > understand what you have written. Probably because it doesn't "make sense." > That is, a series of facts about the method, all new, are being presented > without the *significance* being known. This is about pedagogy, Mike, and > polemic, the same thing, really. > Now I'll put in some effort. Realize that most people will not. And they > will dislike that the information is being presented this way, and they > will not trust it. > > Okay, I think I get it. *If* the chicken dilemma is found to be damaging > results, it might even be useful. I still find the *meaning* of this, i.e., > the actual effect it will have on voter behavior, obscure. It seems to me > like the "conditional approvals" being counted are dependent upon the > behavior of other voters. I find that highly suspect. My "conditional > approvals" are being deprecated. It might be fair, because if I don't like > that, I can fully approve. But I'd still want to be able to rank my > approvals.... > > > But people will understand that, in examples like the one below, it's >> good if the voter can >> make an approval conditional upon reciprocity: >> >> (If you haven't been on the list lately, you might not have seen this >> "Approval bad-example": >> > > Probable. > > > > Sincere preferences: >> >> 27: A>B >> 24: B>A >> 49: C >> >> The A voters should approve B, and the B voters should approve A. >> > > Why? Mike, *that depends on preference strength.* *You* may not have been > following long-term discussions on these lists.... > > Okay, let's assume that the B>C and A>C preference strengths are solid. > First of all, this is a race where A and B would, in most situations, > cooperate; one of them would drop out, it is a very close election and by > both running they are risking the election of C. > > The scenario posits C who would win Plurality hands-down if this is the > situation. A and B are close, relatively speaking. > > Mike, you are showing a situation which demonstrates the power of runoff > voting. Runoff systems resolve this just fine. There is majority failure, C > is way ahead of A and B, but the leader between A and B will go into the > runoff with C. It works perfectly, in fact, this will be very likely to > elect A. > How about Bucklin/Runoff> You have presented a scenario where the C voters > equally detest A and B. This kind of division of society, with this class > of voter being *almost* a majority, is not something I've seen in real > life. You have the A voters and B voters divided, with no specification of > preference strength. This is the kind of voting system study that I've > argued against for years. It has a value, but it is purely created to show > a criterion failure or the like. Whether it is realistic or not isn't even > addressed, often. > > IRV handles this situation, of course. IRV was *invented* to handle this, > the problem is it breaks down badly elsewhere. Now, I've looked at a lot of > IRV elections, and I've never seen one that looked like this. The problem > of clones (and to some extent A and B are clones, as to the C voters' view) > is not just in voting systems, it damages campaigns. A and B need to > cooperate to beat C. > > If this is the "chicken dilemma," it's been made up. What this situation > means (if we interpret it realistically) is that C is likely to win. > Period. A whole lot of reality has been truncated. There will be write-in > votes. There will be voters whose voting patterns don't make sense. C is > within the noise of winning, whereas A and B voter behavior has to be about > perfect. > > Do we know of any real-life example of the Chicken dilemma? > > How would Bucklin handle this? Do the A and B voters know the risk? If so, > they would be likely to vote their preferences. C voters, would they be > aware of the danger that A would win? After all, they also have a strong > preference, as this is stated. In fact, some of them will prefer one of A > or B. Voters are *not* identical, they resemble each other *statistically.* > > In any system that awards an election based on plurality, C will be almost > certain to win. Even IRV, with real voters, C's awfully likely. Some A and > B voters will truncate. > > I've never seen an IRV election that shifts preferences as drastically as > required to accomplish the defeat of C. What is normal, in fact, is that > the additional votes from eliminations have *no effect* on relative > standing, in nonpartisan elections. > > And if this is a partisan election, it is *really, really weird* that A > and B are duking it out! > > Runoff voting was designed to fix this. Vote splitting, among candidates > where one of them could win if not for the presence of the other, will > typically cause majority failure. > > If this were Bucklin runoff, it might well make sense for the A and B > voters not to trade approvals. But they would be risking that C bumps over > the majority line. > > > But what if the A voters >> approve B, and the B voters don't approve A? Then B will win, and the B >> voters will have >> successfully taken advantage of the A voters' co-operativeness and >> sincerity. >> > > People are far more alike than you might realize. If A voters betray, B > voters also betray, they betray equally, more or less. So C wins. > > That is why politicians try to avoid situations like this! > > Now, look at this election if the ballot is a Range ballot.... > > > That's the co-operation/defection problem, or the chicken dilemma. >> > > A false dilemma, that assumes people are playing a game different from > what they actually play, and that society is as neatly divisible into > factions like this. Most people won't sweat this at all! > > > If you're an A voter, you'd be glad to hear that you can give a >> conditional approval to B, an >> approval that is conditional upon reciprocity. >> > > This is doing something with the election process, making it a goal in > itself..... I'm not thrilled. I'd want to see how the method performs in > simulations. > > But it can be difficult to model strategy. There is a cost here, the cost > in canvassing complexity. I'm not convinced I'd approve it. > > > > So, what AOC does isn't complicated to tell. People would understand why >> they'd like it. >> > > I'm still not convinced I really understand it. I could probably explain > it, though, i.e., how the counts are modified. What I don't get is why this > is really necessary. It's obviously devaluing information from the voter, > based on some assumption that... what? That voters have not been properly > reciprocal? But that would seem to assume that the A>B and B>A preference > strengths are the same. They will not be, in general! > > I think this algorithm could damage overall social utility. In fact, with > sincere votes, it's obvious that it *will.* > > The question would be whether it balances out the damage from strategic > voting (which, because the votes are not "maximally sincere," does damage > S.U.) I'm pretty strongly suspecting, no, it causes further damage by > removing a strategic voting effect that may not exist. > > > In any case, remember that I don't suggest AOC for a first proposal, >> partly because the simpler >> plain Approval is simpler, and partly because AOC is to >> computation-intensive for an easy, convenient >> handcount. At first, till a count-fraud-proof computer count can be >> guaranteed, only a handcount >> is acceptable. The benefits of the best and most sophisticated method are >> nil if count-fraud >> changes the result. >> > > Well, fortunately, we agree on this. And, likely, it will be up to future > generations. > > > I don't know whether GMAT &/or MMT is suitable for handcounting. >> > > I lose the abbreviations. > > > By the way, though Bucklin was used with a handcount, ER-Bucklin, with >> the MMC-preserving delay that I spoke >> of, is incomparably more computation-intensive than ordinary Bucklin, and >> therefore, almost surely unsuited to >> a handcount. And, without that delay, you lose MMC compliance. >> > > Not sure what you mean. ER-Bucklin can be hand-counted, and was (it was > often ER in lower ranks than first). Your "delay" may well introduce > problems. I don't know what you mean, in fact. > > > You asked about what I meant, regarding that delay: >> > > Glad I did! > > > Suppose that, at your 3rd rank position, you've ranked 5 candidates. Say >> that in round N, they get votes from your >> ballot. The delay provision that I speak of (and which is in the >> electowiki definition of ER-Bucklin) says that >> your votes to your 4th ranked candidates won't be given any sooner than >> they would be if you'd ranked your 5 >> rank-3 candidates in separate consecutive rank positions. In other words, >> in this example, your 4th ranked >> candidates don't get their votes from you until round N+5. >> > > Gosh, people can make things complicated. Just effing count the votes! How > in the world did ER-Bucklin become so complex? I, naively, assumed that it > was *Bucklin* with Equal Ranking allowed. Who tacked all this absolutely > hopeless crap onto it? > > > If you'd ranked those candidates in consecutive rank positions, then one >> of them would get your vote in round N. >> The 2nd would get a vote in round N+1....and the 5th would get your vote >> in round N+4. So only in round N+5 >> would your ballot then give to your next candidate. >> > > I could probably actually understand this if I suspected it were > worthwhile! > > This is utterly damaging to social utility, as I see it. I see Bucklin as > practically using a Range ballot, with an analytical method that slides > down the approval cutoff until there is a majority. If voters vote > sincerely, it's obvious that messing with the counting messes with the > basic principle. Now, maybe, somehow, this compensates for the problem with > majority-seeking in general (social utility optimization can violate the > majority criterion). > > But, you should know, I dislike overcoming a majority preference without > the voters being explicity asked if it's okay! Or, at least, having > expressed that, as by unconditionally approving, by a majority as well as a > plurality, a candidate. > > > As I said, that preserves Mutual-Majority-Criterion compliance, but it >> greatly increases the labor of a handcount, >> almost surely making handcount infeasible. >> > > And it also makes the voters dizzy when they try to understand the effect > of their vote.... > > > > So then, when you rank 5 candidates at rank 3, receiving your votes in >> round >> N,your 4th ranked candidates don't get votes from you until round N+5. At >> that time, all of your >> 4th-ranked candidates receive your votes. >> >> So, of the Approval election vote-management options that I've proposed, >> the only ones suitable for a handcount >> would be MTA, MCA (ordinary, non-conditional), and maybe GMAT &/or MMT >> (someone else might be able to answer whether >> GMAT or MMT would be handcount-suitable). >> >> At least for now, a handcount is the only reliable way to avoid >> count-fraud. >> > > I agree. That's why paper ballots should be used (even if they are printed > by machine -- and the voters should have that printed ballot in their hands > for inspection, before they deposit it in the ballot box). > > Sorry about not putting more effort into understanding MMC. I should, at > least, understand the criterion itself. I'll look at that, thanks for your > effort. > > > Some people are very worried about fraud on the part of some voters. What >> we should really be worried about >> is count-fraud. >> > > Indeed. > (to be continued.) > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info >
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