2012-04-14T05:34:03Z, “Robert Bristow-Johnson” <[email protected]>:
> On 4/13/12 5:46 PM, “⸘Ŭalabio‽” wrote: >> 2012-04-13T:17:09Z, “Robert Bristow-Johnson” >> <[email protected]>: >>> On 4/13/12 3:11 PM, “⸘Ŭalabio‽” wrote: >>>> I have had interactions with people on this list hating rated ballots. >>>> I have a question for them: >>> and my question for you is: how high should a voter rate his/her >>> contingency choice? >> As high or low as the voter likes. > doesn't answer the question. the voter likes Candidate A the best and > will, in a mano-a-mano race, vote for Candidate A against any other > candidate. Candidate C is Satan from hell. This voter will vote for > *anyone*, even Stalin, if such a candidate was in a two-person race against > Candidate C. Candidate B is someone else. voter doesn't like him as much as > A but certainly more than C. > how should this voter score Candidate B? this voter will have regrets > if he (and other voters like him) scored B too high and B defeated A. and > this voter will have regrets if he (and other voters like him) scored B too > low and C beat him and won the election. > Score voting *inherently* saddles the voters with a tactical voting > burden. So does Approval voting. No system is perfect. >>> he/she does not want to harm their favorite candidate (that would >>> indicate rating the 2nd choice with 0) and he/she does not want to help >>> their last choice (which would suggest ranking the 2nd choice higher). >> You have a legitimate point. That is why I favor multiple rounds. > oh, c'mon! multiple rounds? decisiveness is not a desirable property? Multiple rounds is a powerful tool for vetting. I admit that multiple rounds is annoying, but, in situations where hundreds of candidates run, and I only have time to research a score of them, multiple rounds is a good thing. >>>> If the ballot would allow both ratings and rankings, ?would that be >>>> acceptable? >>> sounds simple. i'm sure the electorate or the legislature will go for >>> that. >> I like sarcasm. > sorry. No need to apologize. I was not sarcastic. I really do like sarcasm. >> I even wrote a post about this just a few days ago called >> “A procedure for handling large numbers of candidates using scorevoting >> with primaries and runoffs.” >> 2012-04-10T01:57:49Z >> If you do not have the post, I shall forward you a copy, at your >> request. > if you posted it here, lemme know the date and i'll look for it. or > else send it to me. The date is 2012-04-10T01:57:49Z. I was sarcastic just then in repeating the date. The intent is humor, not a putdown. I found the post in the archives: http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2012-April/030163.html >>> it's also important to have a consistent rule that applies to every >>> voter. while every voter has a choice of ranking vs. rating, it's not >>> particularly consistent. it's consistent regarding the *choice* but the >>> actually quantitative measure is not >> I included a table as an example about how to quantify it. The >> algorithm is thus: >> 1 divided by ranking. Take the resulting fraction and multiply it by >> 99. Round the result to the nearest integer. > but your mapping makes the ranked ballot synonymous with the score > ballot. that is my point. In all voting systems, one counts votes at some point. ScoreVoting is just more explicit about it. >>>> The ballot could allow ranking or ratings with equal rankings or >>>> ratings allowed. The rankings would then be converted to ratings like thus: > so you're saying that we can have our choice between rating and > ranking, as long as we choose rating. Frankly, I do not see what the big deal is, given that at some point one must quantify, anyway. > because, given your system of quantifying it, it still boils down to > rating. it is *not* ranking where there *is* no information in the ranking > for how *much* you like Candidate A over Candidate B, only that you *do* like > A over B. that's the essential difference. Yes, but it is good to know how-much one likes candidate Alpha over Candidate Bravo. It seems an improvement to me. > your combination of rating and ranking becomes essentially rating. True, but I do not see this as a problem. > >>>> ¿Would this be acceptable? >>> as acceptable as Borda. >> The thing is that it is not Borda. > Borda is a form of Score ballot. it *is* like Borda. Many, such as Arrow, consider Borda a ranked system. at this point, we should distinguish between systems where the type of ballot and whether the ballot generates only preferences or scores: Plurality and approval use ballots of both score and ranking and give preference information in scores and preferences. Condorcet and IRV use ranked ballots and record preferences. Score uses a rating ballot and records scores. Borda is a ranked method and records scores. At this point, it is clear that we talk at crosspurposes: I merely want a way to somehow translate ranked ballots into score-ballots by means of an arbitrary algorithm. You want to just have preference information. We fundamentally want different things. Since you like Condorcet, I have a suggestion: It is tedious to rank hundreds of candidates, but sometimes monster is on the ballot and all unranked candidates are last. If the field is so polarized that the voters idiotically refuse to rank other serious candidates other than their candidate and the evil candidate has followers, the bad candidate might win. I suggest that Condorcet should have a dummy-candidate: 0 The ranked candidates. 1 The unranked candidates. 2 The dummy-canditate. 3 The monsters. All unranked candidates have higher ranks than the monsters. One can then rank the monsters by how terrible they are. Basically, it is a way to vote against monsters in Condorcet without having to rank all of the hundreds of also-rans. I should make this into a separate post. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
