On Apr 20, 2012, at 5:30 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You said:
I choke when I see IRV called "fine"
[endquote]
Have I ever said that, without qualifying it? No.
I've said that IRV would be fine with an electorate different from
the one tht we now have--an electorate completely free of inclination
to overcompromise, so that even IRV's flagrant FBC failure wouldn't
induce them to overcompromise.
I've said that IRV would be fine for me, as a voter.
I'm not one of those who is inclined to overcompromise for a lesser-
evil.
Its MMC compliance and defection-proofness would work fine for me.
You continued:
- it too easily ignores parts of
what the voters say. For example, look at what can happen with A
being much liked, yet IRV not always noticing:
20 A
20 B>A
22 C>A
Joe ?
Condorcet would see A elected by 62 votes (plus, perhaps, Joe's
63rd).
[endquote]
It would help to specify more about Joe. Examples with a voter whose
preferences
and vote are unknown are difficult to comment on.
Mike chose to ignore the rest of what I wrote. I will copy that at
the end and comment.
A is well liked - except for Joe, every voter votes for A.
B and C contend, with NO voter voting for both.
A and B voters are a majority, but not a mutual majority. the A
voters are indifferent
Huh! B and C each got 1/3 of the votes - about tying each other, but
far from a majority.
between B and C. So, maybe you're pointing out that for {A,B} to win
or not win, it depends on
which one gets eliminated first. True. Not ideal, I agree, but the B
voters want the coalition
and the A voters don't. So whether there's a coalition will depend
on which one gets eliminated
first.
And we do know that the A voters are indifferent between B and C,
because IRV gives them
no incentive to defect.
Mike Ossipoff
End of my email, that Mike did not include:
Condorcet would see A elected by 62 votes (plus, perhaps, Joe's
63rd). IRV would be affected by Joe's vote:
. A - 63 votes with B and C discarded.
. B - 22 for C after 20A and 21B&20A discarded.
. C - 23 votes with A and B discarded.
Joe could have voted for A, B, or C, and have this noticed by IRV. A
vote for A or C would cause them to win; a vote for B would cause C to
win.
DWK
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