The difference between Intermediate FBC and Intermediate FBC-2 is about whether or not it might be necessary to insincerely uprank some bottom-deserving candidates from bottom to to 2nd-to-bottom, in order to maximally help to defeat another one which is left at bottom.
The matter that is relevant to FBC criteria is the the top end consideration of insincerely downranking one's favorite from top.So, though Intermediate FBC-2 might distinguish among some methods, it doesn't do so in a way that differs importantly from Intermediate FBC. So I withdraw my suggestion of Intermediate FBC-2 as a possible useful criterion. Intermediate FBC is suggested as an awkward attempt to look at difficult distinctions that were impliled when FBCs of differing strengths were brought up. The Weak (ordinary) FBC and Strong FBC are more simply-defined anyway. Ordinary (Weak) FBC, which I've been citing for a long time, makes a useful distinction, when it is shown that most methods, includng Condorcet, Kemeny, and IRV, fail even that most lenient, easily-passed, FBC. Approval passes Strong FBC, but I don't claim to know what, if any, other method(s) pass Strong FBC. No one has suggested or demonstrated that any method other than Approval passes Strong FBC. Cubicle society: In reply to a posting that just apeared, with its link to a website,, I suggest that we actually have what amounts very nearly to the cubicle-society described in that posting's website-reference. People rely on the mass-media to tell them how other people feel on issues, and how those other people will vote. That's why nearly everyone seems to believe it when the media tell us what "the two choices" are. Several authors, including Noam Chomsky, and probably the historian MIchael Parenti, have pointed out that each person, believing the media, believes that s/he is alone in her preferences, positions, beliefs and social poliicy wishes. Each perfson therefore feels resigned and hopeless. Plurality's peculiar all-but-one-at-bottom rule is necessary to protect that misinformation. Of course open and honest media, reflecting genuine, unfiltered, unmodified, input from the public, would tell a very different story. But when voters are allowed to express approval for more than one candidate, the election results will show public preferences very different from those in our big-money-controlled media. I know, I've already said that, but it's relevent to the cublcle society described in the website. But, not only is the information regarding the preferences and wishes of the other voters distorted by media, but, additionally, now at least, the count of the actual votes is unverified, and therefore not legimiate. Look at the issues of _Harper's_ magazine that appeared soon after the 2004 presidential election. Harpers described many pieces of evidence that the 2004 election count was falsified. As you may remember, there was much similar fraudulent-count evidence described regarding the 2000 election as well. But here's something that many people seem to miss: Even when it isn't shown that a count is fraudulent, the count is still non-legitimate if it isn't vefifiable. A political system's use of a non-verifiable machine-count is ridiculous. Maybe it could be somehow possible for a machine-count to be verifiable. But, untiil then, a handcount is necessary. That's another disadvantage of rank-balloting voting systems--Most of them aren't feasibly hand-countable. Mike Ossipoff .
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