On Apr 28, 2012, at 12:56 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
First, my apologies to Paul Kislanko, whom I called by the wrong
name when I replied to his posting, a few minutes ago.
_This_ reply is to Dave Ketchum:
Dave:
I'd said:
> How to avoid this problem? Why not repeal the rule that makes >
Plurality so funny? Let people rate _every_ candidate with a 1 or >
a 0. Rate every candidate as "Approved" or "Unapproved". The >
candidate with the most "Approved" ratings wins. The result? Well, >
we'd be electing the most approved candidate, wouldn't we. Who can >
criticize that? >
You replied:
Anyone who realizes that there is more to wish for.
My next sentence was part of completing that thought:
Here you can vote for both Favorite and Compromise to help defeat
Worse, but cannot vote for both without implying equal liking for
each - and thus risking unwanted election of Compromise.
[endquote]
Ah, "If wishes were horses..." :-)
Far be it for to tell you what you should or shouldn't wish for. But
you should keep the distinction
between wishes, fantasy, and feasible possibilities.
Anyway, as I explained to you when we had this same discussion a few
days ago, even you can't complain
about changing from Plurality to Approval. (At least I assume that
you don't believe that you have an argument
agains that change).
It being an improvement I did not, and do not, argue against changing
from Plurality to Approval - the improvement is minor, but the effort
is comparatively minor.
Going back to your thoughts when starting this series, Plurality does
not allow voters to adequately express their desires. They do not
want Worse, so vote for Compromise as the best hope of accomplishing
this major goal under Plurality - they feel that voting for Favorite
may let Worse win.
Approval helps by letting them vote for both Favorite and Compromise.
However this is only a partial correction since it says they have
equal liking for each.
Thus I argue for using a stronger method, such as Condorcet, that will
let voters more completely indicate which candidates they most prefer
when voting for more than one:
. It matters little whether Approval is used until we agree on
something better - it is better than Plurality but very little
different.
. While I promote Condorcet, I do not here argue for or against
varieties, even such as ICT that Mike talks of.
You can say, "But I want something more complicated that I claim
will be better." But that isn't an argument against
changing from Plurality to Approval. That change (from Plurality to
Approval) amounts to nothing more than repealing the ridiculous rule
that
is Purality's problem.
Now, as I've discussed, a proposal to change from Plurality to
Condorcet would be a whole other ballgame.If you want
to try that, then feel free to. But don't say I told you to.
You continued:
Here you can vote for both Favorite and Compromise to help defeat
Worse, but cannot vote for both without implying equal liking for each
[endquote]
In a u/a election (there are unacceptable candidates who could win)
your best strategy in Condorcet
is to rank all of the acceptable candidates in 1st place, and not
rank any unacceptable candidates.
Doing so doesn't imply that you equally like everyone whom you equal-
rank.
"1st place" puzzles. Thinking of Favorite and Compromise, I likely
want to vote for both in Condorcet, but to rank Favorite higher to
indicate my preference.
You continued:
- and thus risking unwanted election of Compromise.
[endquote]
Sorry, but you do need to risk that, in Condorcet, in a u/a
election. But don't feel too bad, because "unwanted"
has a whole other (and stronger) meaning when applied to the
unacceptable candidates.
I'd said:
If you have given 1 point to > Compromise, and 0 points to Worse,
then it’s obvious that also > giving a point to Favorite won’t
change the fact that you’ve fully > helped Compromise against Worse. >
You say:
The above sentence emphasizes what happens to Compromise vs Worse,
ignoring that it destroys Favorite's desired advantage over
Compromise.
[endquote]
But, with Condorcet, you can't say what I said: Top-ranking Favorite
means that you aren't fully helpng Compromise against Worse.
There are situations in which Worse will win instead of Compromise
because you top-ranked Favorite alongside Compromise.
The thinking is getting confused. You are quoting what I said about
Approval, and then incorrectly stating what this might do to Condorcet.
In Condorcet if I rank Compromise, but not Worse, that is as strong as
I can be as to this pair. If I also rank Favorite higher, that is as
strong as I can be as to these. Worse, being unranked, is shown as
least liked among these.
As to top-ranking both Favorite and Compromise, that indicates liking
them equally, but does not affect them vs unranked Worse.
Dave Ketchum
Therefore, many people will be afraid to top-rank their favorite.
When Plurality’s falsification > problem is discussed, Plurality’s
inexplicable problem-causing > rule, then anyone trying to claim
that that problem should be kept > will be arguing an indefensible
position, and will be seen by all > for what he is. I’m not saying
that desperate arguments for keeping > Plurality’s problem won’t be
made. I’m saying that they won’t work. >
You say:
Agreed that Approval was an easy, but valuable, step up from
Plurality.
[endquote]
We agree that Approval should be the first step. Then what is your
complaint? I myself have said that I'd like to have
the rank method ICT (if it could be assured that people will
understand or trust that it lets them safely
vote their favorite in 1st place). But I was talking about what'd
feasible now. Let's not confuse immediate proposals
with discussion of possible plans for the more distant future.
You continued:
But, Approval does not help us vote our preference for Favorite over
Compromise. I offer Condorcet as one easy step for this capability.
[endquote]
Sure it does, if that's what you want to do. No one's forcing you to
approve Compromise.
But you're saying that you want to vote all of your preferences. You
want the relatively complicated sort of method that
has that kind of balloting, and you want to not be able to give the
guaranteee that top-rating your favorite won't worsen your
outcome. If tha's what you want to propose, feel free to.
If you like rank balloting, you could have that with ICT, without
losing FBC. And you'd gain defection-resistance. But no rank
method is a winnable proposal right now, though they make a great
topic for future speculation. But don't confuse fantasy
with current feasibility.
You continued:
The negatives below suggest this is a difficult step. Agreed, but its
value says it is worth trying.
[endquote]
It would be better to try it later. It isn't winnable now.
Condorcetists probably haven't discussed voting systems with members
of the public much. Or heard the objections that are made, regarding
reform voting systems. To ignore those considerations is to live in
Fantasyland.
That Condorcetists want to put their money on a sure-loser longshot,
is probably due to the fact that they really haven't looked at the
changes that Approval would make. I recommend that Dave re-read the
article that he's criticizing.
I told of the societal benefits that Approval would bring, and I
told why.
Myerson & Weber have told why Approval will quickly home in on the
voter median (CW position) and then stay there.
Yes, you'd like rank balloting. I'd like ICT (more for defection-
resistance, but also for rank-balloting too,to a lesser extent).
But don't let your greed for more cause you to not get anything.
Isn't there an Aesop's fable about that?
Let's argue Condorcet vs ICT when Approval has been in use for a
while, because that's when the public and the media
will be suitable for enacting a rank method. But, even then, I
suggest that there's no point in a rank balloting method that
isn't defection-resistant.
Mike Ossipoff
Dave Ketchum
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