It is not only proportionality, but individual-based support method
that make the difference.
Using the same STV will of the electorate, and this possible closed
lists (B3-B2-B1, R3-R2-R1, Y3-Y2-Y1),
we obtain a different Global individual satisfaction measure, despite
the fact that we still elect one representative of each political party.
Voters will:
10%: B3 B2 Y2 R1 R2 Y1 Y3 R3 B1
30%: R1 R2 R3 B1 B2 B3 Y1 Y2 Y3
51%: B1 Y1 Y2 Y3 R1 R3 R2 B3 B2
9%: Y1 B1 R1 B2 R2 Y3 Y2 R3 B3
They do their best to maximize their results... (Some of the 51% will
vote Yellow...)
Elected: B3 R3 Y3.
Individual satisfaction of the first group of voters: 33,3% (two elected
among the 3 first choices)
Individual satisfaction of the second group of voters: 33,3% (one
elected among the 3 first choices)
Individual satisfaction of the third group of voters: 0% (none elected
among the 3 first choices)
Individual satisfaction of the fourth group of voters: 0% (none elected
among the 3 first choices)
Global individual satisfaction of all voters: 10% x 33,3% + 30% x 33,3%
+ 51% x 0% + 9% x 0% = 13,3%
A lot worst...
Stéphane
On 2012-05-03 15:46, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 05/03/2012 09:29 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:
I like this analogy. It does not amplify enough, yet it prompted me to
think of this idea:
We tend to think of politics as a pyramid that has our few-in-number
leaders at the top, and the numerous voters at the bottom who support
the leaders through voting.
In contrast, an upside-down pyramid might be more realistic. Each layer
in the pyramid corresponds to one of the layers mentioned above. At the
bottom are the few voters who marked on their primary-election ballot
support for the Congressmen who voted (as part of a majority) to pass a
new law. I'm still working out how best to draw it, yet this seems like
a useful path to clarify the importance of election-method reform.
I first found this pattern when considering forms of council
democracy. In these types of democracy, you have local councils that
appoint representatives from their number to form regional councils
that appoint representatives... and so on up.
In the worst case, a bare majority at every level can control the
whole system. In a one-level system, a majority suffices (which is
much less than 100%); in a two-level system, a majority of a majority;
in a three level system, a majority of a majority of a majority and so
on.
Generally, if the councils are of size n, then a majority m is
floor(n/2) + 1. Call the fraction required to get a majority, f. f =
m/n, and this approaches 50% as n goes to infinity.
Then in the very worst case, f^(num levels) of the total population
suffice to control the council democracy. In a primary system, it's
worse since only a fraction of the population can vote in any given
primary (excepting open/jungle primaries), and not all who can vote
are going to.
On 4/28/2012 10:52 AM, Stéphane Rouillon wrote:
...
With an STV election, 3 seats in a single super-district, let's
assume ...
...
Typically STV produces a global individual satisfaction rates around
twice FPTP rates for the simulations
I have made yet...
...
This does not covers the layering effect of multiple representative
levels, but it emphasizes the mismatch
between the will of electors and the results.
Stéphane Rouillon
Yes, proportional methods reduce the number of wasted votes (which can
be defined in various ways). Yet, as you say, this does not address the
layering effect. Nevertheless, thank you for your ideas.
In the council model, proportional representation does help, so to
some extent it does alleviate the layering effect. If a council elects
three instead of one to the next level, then in the worst case, the
faction has to get all of them for enough councils to get a sufficient
supermajority on the next level, and so on.
In a primary system, I think the most clear benefit is that it
dissolves the problem. If you have proportional representation,
there's no need for primaries - at least not for legislative
elections. Any group that disagrees with the party can simply leave
that party to form a party of its own.
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