On 23.5.2012, at 0.38, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> Juho says:
>
> Maybe the number one on the list of the still unanswered questions is the
> following one.
>
>
> [example+question starts here]
>
> 26: A > B >> C
> 26: B > A >> C
> 24: C >> A > B
> 24: C >> B > A
> - A and B are Democrats and C is a Republican
>
> How should voters vote after seeing these (quite reliable) poll results if
> they follow the "better than expectation" strategy? Should A and B be seen as
> the expected winners with 50% winning chance both? Maybe 50% of the voters
> should guess that A wins and 50% that B wins (?).
>
> [endquote]
>
> You don’t say how good a result the various voters expect from the election.
In my recent mail, where I studied the Approval strategy that you gave and this
example opinion set, I gave some guesses on how the voters might estimate the
outcome of the election (expectation).
> You don’t say if it’s u/a.
What is the definition of u/a? Is it needed for the Approval strategy that you
gave?
> You show higher magnitude dislike for C, among the A and B voters. Should we
> infer that you mean that it’s u/a, and that, to the A and B voters, A and B
> are acceptable and B is unacceptable? …that {A,B} and {C} are sets such that
> the merit differences within the sets are negligible in comparison to the
> merit differences between the sets? If so, then the Approval’s u/a strategy
> would call for the A and B voters to approve A and B.
>
> But there’s the co-operation/defection problem, isn’t there. I’ve discussed
> it. I’ve described some solutions to it, in a post in recent days. I’ll
> re-post my list of 5 solutions.
>
> But remember that Condorcet equally has the co-operation/defection problem
> too.
I'm planning to study the strength of that problem when I get the description
of the strategy.
>
> What about ICT in your example? The A voters should vote A>B. The B voters
> should vote B>A.
I have not thought of that. I'll come back if I find something useful to say on
this topic.
Juho
>
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
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