> On 29.5.2012, at 3.05, Michael Ossipoff wrote: > > > And Approval doesn't share Condorcet's favorite-burial incentive problem. > > All Condorcet methods fail the FBC criterion. But in practice situations where the > related burial strategy would be easy to use successfully or defensive burial > would be really needed are rare
Irrelevant, even if true. I've repeated many times for you my observations and conversations with Democrat lesser-evil voters. No, I'm not going to repeat it again for you. So since you've forgotten about it, then just take my word for it that the available evidence indicates that favorite-burial will be rampant in Condorcet. >(possibly not even relevant in typical real life) Causing people to favorite-bury makes it relevant. > elections). In Approval it is quite common that you have to "betray" your > favourite to the level of its competitors (but not below). That's your new definition of "burial" :-) >Approval may thus well > involve more "favourite betraying" (in a wider meaning than what FBC uses) In a modified meaning that you've come up with ad hoc, to try to make Approval sound as bad as Condorcet. >than > Condorcet methods. In Approval, no one has any reason to not top-rate their favorite(s). That isn't true of Condorcet. > > > And Condorcet shares Approval's C/D problem. > > Approval is quite clueless when there are more than two potential winners. I've just finished explaining to you that the goal of single-winner reform assumes that there will be more than two potential winners. Evidently you're too clueless to be aware that I just finished explaining that to you. You'd need to define "cluelessness" as an attribute of a voting system. Ok, that does it. This is my last reply to you, at least on this issue. I'm not wasting any more time on you. I'll finish this reply, and then that's it. To anyone else: My subsequent non-reply to Juho doesn't mean that he's said something irrefutable. It just means that I finally decided to stop wasting my time by repeating answers to his repeated arguments. > Voters have to guess which important preference they should indicate and which > one they should falsify and claim to be a tie. Juho is all confused about what "falsify" means. To falsify a preference is to vote a preference that isn't really a preference of yours. Condorcet, but not Approval, gives incentive to falsify one or more preferences. I've repeated for you, many time, some suggestions for voting in Approval. Those suggestions included expectation-maximizing strategies. No, I won't repeat them again for you. In Condorcet we are again talking > about cases that may be very marginal. Juho neglected to define marginal. "Marginal" might not mean much, when describing a strategy that will be widely used. Juho says: >In Condorcet sincere ranking (indication > of all preferences) is a good strategy. Only in 0-info, non-u/a elections. We've already discussed this. If you've forgotten, it isn't my responsibility to discuss it again with you. > > Therefore your assumption that the Republocrats are all that's viable > > won't hold up long in Approval. > > I don't assume that. Sooner or later some of the former minor > parties/candidates are likely to grow, and there will be more than two potential > winners. There may however be some tendency to stick to the old major parties > in the system that you proposed (where Approval is used in single-member > districts to elect representative bodies) since those old parties may still be the > most influential ones in the political system of the U.S. for a long time. Dream on, Juho. Juho is saying that the Republicans and Democrats will remain influential because they'll remain influential. Juho neglects to explain why or how they'll remain influential when (for reasons that I've amply described) more liked platforms and proposals are well-known, and the high support numbers for those platforms are well-known. Juho is engaging in wishful thinking. > > The "problem" that you speak of, in > > which people have the preferences Green>Democrat>Republican will > > vanish when it becomes obvious that he Republocrats aren't as popular > > as the media have been claiming. The Republican threat will no longer > > be taken seriously, and the idea of a need to support the > > nearly-identical Democrat, to protect from the Republican, will be seen as > >hilarious. > > In many political systems that use Plurality, IRV or TTR voters are quite unaware > of the problems of the methods and better alternative methods, and therefore > they do not care much about the problems. On the contrary, voters in Plurality countries know and care about Plurality's favorite-burial need. The care enough about it to always bury their favorite. > I however assume that in Approval > the strategic problems with more than two serious potential winners would raise > some concern. People might be "hilarious" after the Republican is no longer a > threat No no what I said was that the notion of the Republican being a threat will be seen as hilarious. >, but maybe confused while any of the three might still win. Typically, it isn't known who will win. But I've provided suggestions, including strategic suggestions, for voting in Approval. And, more recently I've specifically looked at strategy considerations with Progressives, Dems and Repubs. As I said, this is my last reply to Juho on this issue. My non-reply won't mean that Juho has said something irrefutable. It will merely mean that I'm not longer wasting my time repeating things for him. Mike Ossipoff ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
