Lomax quoted me: > At 10:38 PM 5/31/2012, Michael Ossipoff wrote: > >As I was saying in a recent previous post about this, Approval's count > >results will tell Green-preferrers whether or not they need Dem to > >protect against Repub. > > > >And I gave a reason why that is: Preferrers of the middle of 3 parties > >have no reason to approve either extreme. I told of a reason why that is. >
...and replied: > Perhaps you did, but you are framing this as a general truth, when your > arguments, here at least, seem to be based on a very particular assumption > about the two major parties And what assumption would that be? It surely is not very particular if you can't say what it is. And I haven't made any assumption about "the two major parties". You have. You're convinced that the Republicans and Democrats will be the "two major parties" even without Plurality. But that isn't really _your_ assumption, is it. Your tv has told you that the Republicans and Democrats are "the two choices". Let no one contradict Lomax's tv! "His master's voice". And no, I didn't frame the 3-party scenario as a general truth. In fact, you might not have noticed it, but I spoke of additional parties, later in the message to which you've just replied. , not the general case at all, nor do I think that most > readers of this list will agree with you. Lomax isn't being very clear with us about he means. Does he mean that most readers of this list won't agree that 3 parties is the general case, or is he referring to his unspecified assumption about the "two major parties". Who knows. By the way, I didn't say that 3 parties is the general case. I discussed a scenario in which 3 parties are perceived viable. Then, the next day, I posted arguments that don't depend any such assumption. > > Further, improved voting systems, of the kind that are most-discussed here, > generally lead to increases in the number of candidates. You got that right. And it will dramatically increase the support received by non-Republocrats. > >What would it take to make your expectation worse than the Green? No, > >even if it were almost certain that the Repub would win, that wouldn't > >do it, because Dem and Repub are so close that you couldn't squeeze an > >amoeba between them. > > This is in your view, Mike, not necessarily the view of the voters. Excuse me, Mr. Lomax, but did I say that the identicalness of the Dems & Repubs is the view of the voters? I have never denied the existence of suckers who think that the Democrats are the "party of the little man", that the Democrats and Republicans significantly differ and oppose and balance eachother, and that the Repubs & Dems are "the two choices". I've never denied that there are people like you. > I find it bizarre > and disappointing that you would base a general argument about three-party > elections on something so flimsy. My arguments in the message to which you're replying don't apply only to 3-party elections. I specifically mentioned the possibility of more parties. If you're saying the assumption of 3-party elections are "flimsy", then I remind you that my arguments in the message to which you're replying don't depend on 3-party elections. If you're saying that the claim of identical-ness of Repubs & Dems is "flimsy", then I guess that you won't be convinced by an argument that refers to that fact. And that's ok, Abd. > Someone who considers the two major parties to be Tweedle-Dum and > Tweedle-Dee, is almost by definition out on the left or right edge. Certainly by the definition espoused by a tv-addict and a tv-true-believer. Yes, "by definition", because your media definition of "center" is "between the Democrat and the Republican". But I'm not going to argue that with you. You're welcome to your beliefs. > The major parties do tend, frequently, to nominate toward the center, hoping to > attract the real middle. Indeed, that's the force behind Center Squeeze. The > *parties* may have great differences ...or they may not :-) The belief that the Republocrats differ significantly from eachother will be debunked when increased support for other platforms makes it no longer possible for the media to pretend that other parties, platforms, and policy proposals don't exist. > , but the candidates are pushed toward the > center, squeezing out a true centrist. Lomax is referring to the "center" that is, by definition, between the Republican and the Democrat. > > >The expected utility for you would have to be a candidate farther away > >from you than the Green and the Repub. And that would be impossible > >with just 3 candidates. > > Let's see how this works without the assumption of almost-identity for the voter > of the two major parties. I don't know about their voters being the same. Their policies, their actions and their moral level are the same. If Lomax means that today's voters don't think that the Repubs and Demos are identical, then I remind him that I haven't claimed otherwise. I shouldn't have to repeat this, and I won't repeat things for Lomax for very long: Though todays' voters don't think that Dems & Repubs are the same, their sameness will be blatantly obvious later, when, due to freedom to support favorites, non-Republocrats will get dramatically higher support numbers, and media will no longer be able to conceal the existence and viability of policies, proposals and platforms that are refreshingly outside the corrupt little Republocrat cesspool. In all of my scenarios, in the 1st Approval election, voters believe that the Democrats and Republicans are so different that electing one instead of the other is important enough to justify whatever strategy that requires. Furthermore, they believe that the only way to defeat the Republican is to make the Democrat win. If I'm going to take the time to look read and reply to the following, then it had better make some point: > Let's assume a left-right scale of 5 (left) to -5 (right). > Say the Green is 5, the Democrat is 1, and the Republican is -5. Just picking > numbers. Lomax is "just picking numbers" that no Green would agree with. He thinks that the Republican is farther from the Democrat than the Democrat is from the Green :-) Just for one example of the actual distances, I'll refer Lomax to Jim Hightower's not-so-surprising account of environmentalist hero Al Gore in East Liverpool, Ohio. Check it out on the Internet. For example, you might search for Jim Hightower, Al Gore, East Liverpool. Or, if that doesn't work, you might add Ohio after East Liverpool. > Suppose a voter is located at 2.5. The voter prefers the Democrat > (regret 1.5), then the Green (regret 2.5), and the regret for the Republican is 7.5. > > Normalized to a scale of 0-6, this is 0 Dem, 1 Green, 6 Repub How is it that now the Green is between the Dem and the Repub? Did Lomax mean 0 Green, 1 Dem, 6 Repub? That still doesn't bear much resemblance or relation to Green 5, Dem 1, Repub -5. Instead of trying to correct or interpret Lomax's "normalization", let's instead just use the original positions ranging from 5 to -5. > , and inverting to > show utilities, it ends up 0 Repub, 5 Green, 6 Dem. For that voter, it's 2/5 Green, 2/3 Dem, 2/15 Repub. If you prefer decimal, it's .4 Green .667 Dem, .133 Repub. > (I'd have preferred to represent this with four parties, including a rightist party, > more to the right than the Republicans, but I'm sticking with Mike's three-party > situation.) My recent scenario, in the message that Lomax is replying to, mentioned a 4th party, and doesn't depend on a specific number of parties. > > Suppose the expectation is that the election is close between the Democrat and > the Republican, and the Green is unlikely to win. The expected utility is then 3 Lomax didn't specify win probabilities for the candidates. Though voters don't calculate their expectation, we should here, if we're going to say what it is. Does he mean that his rough assumption is that the Repub and Dem each have .5 probability of winning? If so, then that voter's expectation is .4 If voting to maximize expectation, s/he should approve Dem. It doesn't matter whether or not s/he approves Green. S/he could flip a coin. , so > the above-expectation strategy is to approve both the Democrat and the Green. No, approve the Democrat. It doesn't matter strategically whether or not s/he approves the Green. But I fully admit that Lomax didn't share with us what he assumes about win probabilities. > Further, our voter is in the left wing of the Democratic party. The voter may wish > to encourage the Democrats to move to the left It's more realistic to assume instrumental strategy. If voters didn't vote instrumentally (to influence the current election only), then a lot of people who voted for Kerry would have instead voted for Nader, just to show support. > , and while the voter, by > definition, prefers the Democrat to the Green, the loss of utility if the Green > wins, because of so many voters pushing in that direction by approving the > Green, is small. But the Republican winning is a disaster to this voter. :-) We keep hearing that. But the election of a Republican would hardly be a new or unprecedented disaster. It happens in roughly every other election. So what has Lomax shown with his example? He's shown that someone who isn't a Green preferrer will approve the Democrat if he considers Dem and Repub the frontrunners, and if the Repub is farther from the Dem than the Dem is from the Green. As I said, in my predictions here, I've assumed that Green preferrers will approve Green and Dem in the 1st Approval election. So, having taken to time to read and take seriously Lomax's example, I find that, in doing so, I've just been wasting my time. Well, I had to reply to it, so as not to seem to be evading it. > What we don't know, really, is how many supporters of a center party will > actually approve the closer of the left or right party candidates. I told, in two different ways, why Middle voters shouldn't approve the extreme candidates. Mike Ossipoff ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
