Hi Nicholas,
----- Mail original ----- > De : Nicholas Buckner <[email protected]> > À : Kevin Venzke <[email protected]> > Cc : election-methods <[email protected]> > Envoyé le : Samedi 9 juin 2012 20h23 > Objet : Re: [EM] Throwing my hat into the ring, possibly to get trampled > >T hank you for the article, as it was informative. It is very true that > Elimination methods tend to eliminate candidates who could go onto > become winners. That's not what I'm saying; I'm saying elimination of candidates helps and hurts the non-eliminated candidates in unpredictable ways. > QLTD doesn't have a single loser to eliminate (it doesn't mention > losers much either). In fact I worn against first-past-the-post > methods (vanilla QLTD) (that's why I go with the "converse" > way--the > elimination way), as they are susceptible to Burying mentioned here > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tactical_voting When you add elimination to a method, it often makes it better, but it also tends to break some criteria. > what I think the original article > (http://www.mcdougall.org.uk/VM/ISSUE6/P4.HTM) tries to show is QLTD > has a problem with a subset criterion to monotocity he called > mono-add-top (which is very close to the Participation criterion). > > My method doesn't have that problem. Let me use his example (though I > have some mild problems with the Droop Quota now, I'll still use it > for these calculations). I am sure it does have that problem. Say that the candidates are X Y Z and X is eliminated and then Z wins. It seems quite possible that you could add Z>X ballots that cause Y to be eliminated instead of X, in which case Z will still be elected only if he beats Y head-to-head as well as X. That's the unpredictability I'm talking about: The Z>X voter would want Z to continue to win, but the method may use the voter's X preference to eliminate Y instead of X, causing Z to lose. Kevin ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
