Double-Ended ICT meets these stronger FBC versions: FBC4:
Premise: V is a set of voters who have the same preferences and vote in the same way. Everyone but V has already voted. The only way that V can keep Worst from winning is by making Compromise win instead. They have a way of voting that would achieve that. Requirement: If V doesn't vote Worst over anyone, and doesn't vote anyone over Compromise, then Worst won't win. [end of FBC4 definition] FBC5: Premise: V is a set of voters who have he same preferences and vote in the same way. Everyone but V has already voted. Set A and Set B are disjoint sets of candidates. The winner will come from Set A or Set B. V has a way of voting that would ensure that the winner doesn't come from Set B. Requirement: If V votes everyone not in Set B over all of the candidates in Set B, and doesn't vote anyone over any of the candidates in Set A, then the winner won't come from Set B. [end of FBC5 definition] I emphasize that Double-Ended ICT is new, and I can't say for sure that it doesn't have some problem or fault. i can't even guarantee that the statements in this post are correct. Though tentative, they seem to be correct. Mike Ossipoff ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
