Jameson:
>> The idea is to give to B just enough so that B will be able to beat C
>> and win, only if the B voters are more numerous than the A voters.
>> After all, if B is bigger, then you don't mind helping B win for you.
>> B is then the rightful winner in {A,B}. But you don't want to help B
>> win if B is smaller than A, and the less-numerous B voters are taking
>> advantage of your co-cooperativeness. Hence SFR.
>
>
> This approach was formalized in Bouton, L., and M. Castanheira. “One Person,
> Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation.” Econometrica 80,
> no. 1 (2012): 43–87. Apparently since then they've done some yet-unpublished
> empirical work to see if people really vote that way if the conditions are
> right; and found that they partially do.
I'm glad to hear that positive news. Thanks for the information.
Mike Ossipoff
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