On Sat, Sep 22, 2012 at 6:11 PM, Juho Laatu <[email protected]> wrote: > On 22.9.2012, at 22.06, Michael Ossipoff wrote: > >> 2. Your statement above implies that Symmetrical ICT doesn't choose as >> well as [...what?] when >> people rank sincerely. That statement requires specification of what >> method(s) choose(s) better than SITC under sincere voting, and why >> that is so. > > Give me a description of who would be the best winner with sincere votes in > the election that we talk about.
You're the one who wants to use the notion of "the best winner with sincere votes". Odd that you need to ask me to describe your ideal sincere winner. If you want to object that ICT and SITC don't choose the ideal sincere winnner well enough, then you're the one who needs to say what you mean by "the best winner with sincere votes". But, with all sincere ballots, many like the idea of electing the CW: The candidate who pair-beats each of the others, when such a candidate exists. When "CW" is legitimately defined, when equal top and equal bottom ranking are interpreted consistent with the preferences, intent and wishes of people voting in that way, then SITC elects the CW. Beatpath, VoteFair, and all unimproved Condorcet methods fail to elect the legitimately-defined CW. So, there is a popular "ideal sincere winner": the CW. You said: Then one can tell what the best method with sincere votes is (or at least give some directions). I don't know what the philosophy of ICT and the other mentioned related methods is if we assume sincere votes. [endquote] A sincere-voting property of SITC is that it elects the legitimately-defined CW. It's the method that does that. You see, what you're missing is that the same disregard for voters preference, wishes and intent tha makes unimproved Condorcet fail FBC, also makes it fail the legitmately-defined Condorcet Criterion, and fail to elect the legimately-defined CW. So, meeting FBC doesn't require some sort of violation of the choice of ideal sincere winner. On the contrary, it comes with the election of the ideal sincere winner, because both gains come from respecting the voters' intent and preference. You said: My understanding is that they have been designed to resist certain strategies, not only to pick the best winner with sincere votes. [endquote] As explained above, Symmetrical ICT avoids favorite-burial need precisely _because_ it respects voter wishes. And if the CW and the Condorcet Criterion are defined according to voter wishes, then Symmetrical ICT is the method that elects the CW when there is one, and meets the Condorcet Criterion. You said: Therefore there must be another method that elects the best winner (based on the definition that you gave) more often than they do. [endquote] So that's your best argument: That, because SITC meets FBC, there must be a method (unspecified by you) that does better under sincere voting. The reason why you don't specify a method that does better than SITC under sincere voting is because you don't even know what a method should do under sincere voting. You ask me to describe the ideal sincere winner, because you don't have any idea what the ideal sincere winner should be. But I gave you a suggestion: The legimately-defined CW. Do you see the irony here? Someone who doesn't know what the ideal sincere winner is, wants say that surely there's some method that chooses it better than Symmetrical ICT. He just doesn't know what that method is, because he doesn't have a suggestion for what the ideal sincere winner would be. >>>This >>> means that one should deviate from the method that picks the best winner >>> with sincere votes... >> >> ...which is _what_ method? > > There are different best methods for different needs. Translation: You can't name one. You said: > (In my text above I asked you to provide a definition of the best candidate. > A simple Condorcet oriented definition could be e.g. "the candidate that > requires least additional support/votes to beat any of the other candidates > in a pairwise comparison/battle should be elected". This target could be > selected because it gives one rational argument why the winner could be able > to rule well (= only little bit of additional support needed (if any) to gain > majority support for his proposals while in office).) [endquote] That sounds like Dodgson. Sure, it can be justified as you say. You want to elect the best winner under sincere voting. Is that what you claim is the best winner under sincere voting (ideal sincere winner)? You described a circular tie solution, for when there's no CW. And presumably the CW that you'd choose would be the traditional (as opposed to legitimate) one. So, for one thing, your method wouldn't choose the candidate who legitimately beats each one of the others under sincere voting. And, if you say that SITC's justification doesn't apply in sincere voting, then you'd be mistaken. Say you like X and Y equally, and you rank them both in 1st place.The fact that you like them equally and rank them sincerely in 1st place doesn't mean that you want one to beat the other and give the election to your last choice. SITC respects your wishes better than unimproved Condorcet, even if your equal top ranking is sincere. For another thing, everyone agrees that the election of the CW under sincere voting is a lot more important than how you choose when there _is_ no CW. So the circular-tie-breaker isn't so important. For yet another thing, natural circular ties are considered to be uncommon. Certainly they'd be rare, to the extent that the scenario approximates a 1-dimensional political spectrum, in which issues are strongly correlated (as they tend to actually be). >>> ...only if one is certain that otherwise the method would >>> give even worse results because of strategic voting. >> >> ..even worse than what?? > > A method that has been modified to cope with strategies does not elect the > ideal sincere winner > always. Does any method? You don't know, because you don't know what an ideal sincere winner would be. Aside from that, I answered that statement above.SITC elects the ideal winner better than unimproved Condorcet does, because it better respects voters' intent and preference. When no candidate beats everyone, SITC elects from the set of unbeaten candidates. When no one is beaten, SITC doesn't necessarily choose from the Smith set--probably not even from a legitimately-defined Smith set. Choosing from the Smith set would lose one or more of SITC's desirable properties. But I remind you that the time when it matters who wins under sincere voting is when there is an unbeaten candidate. Or more than one unbeaten candidate. When there's no CW, it's anyone's guess who should win, even under sincere voting. Dodgson's choice is one of many opinions about who should win under sincere voting when there's no CW. >> You haven't said what are the bad results of >> SITC and ITC that we need to avoid. > > See my first comments above. Their deviation from the ideal should become > visible after one defines the ideal sincere winner. Ok, let's define the ideal sincere winner as the legitimately-defined CW. Symmetrical ICT is the method that chooses the legitimately-defined CW. Unimproved Condorcet doesn't. >>> Obviously you believe >>> that basic [unimproved] Condorcet methods would attract certain strategies >>> to the extent >>> that those methods must be fixed. And I believe that in most societies it is >>> more likely that strategic voting will be marginal. > >> Because I don't know what method you're referring to, of course >> there's no way to answer your expression of belief. > > I referred to basic Condorcet methods. (Ranked Pairs, MInmax,...) And remember that unimproved Condorcet also has the chicken dilemma. You said that you don't think that people would favorite-bury. I've answered that amply, but do you also believe that there will be no chicken dilemma? Because, if the chicken dilemma will happen, then it will happen in unimproved Condorcet, because unimproved Condorcet has the chicken dilemma. SITC doesn't have the chicken dilemma. Your talk of sincere voting loses even what relevance it had before, when I remind you that unimproved Condorcet has the chicken dilemma. >> ...aside from the fact that I make no claim to know what's true about >> more than 1/2 of all societies. > > With "most" I wanted to say that I don't expect many societies to converge > towards widespread >strategic voting. That's nice. I don't propose Approval, Score and SITC for "many societies". I propose them for the U.S. (Approval and (maybe) Score for official public elections; and SITC for informational polling--but Score for informational polling when there isn't agreement about choice of rank-count). You said: I start from that assumption and I want evidence before deviating from that assumption. [endquote] Unsupported assumptions tend to lead to error. If you choose some (unspecified) method that doesn't offer good strategy-guarantees, and it turns out that your strategy-free public is a mistaken assumption, then you've made a mistake. SITC doesn't depend on an all-voters-sincere assumption. It would work fine with or without strategically-inclined voters. It would work fine with or without everyone completely non-strategic. And remember, I asked if you think that the chicken dilemma, too, won't happen. ...In other words, I ask if you think that there wouldn't be defection in the familiar chicken dilemma example, in the U.S. in particular, or in "most societies". You depend on an assumption. You think that maybe your assumption is right. Sometimes "maybe" isn't good enough. You don't claim that there wouldn't be favorite-burial in the U.S. You say you've had conversations with Americans. Does it occur to you that there could be some "sample bias" there? How often does Joe Sixpack really get to Europe? Do you also assume no chicken dilemma? SITC doesn't need an assumption of sincere voting. Nor does it fail to choose well when everyone votes sincerely. All the fighting about which unimproved Condorcet version is best is quibbling about what is best when there is no CW. ...in other words, about the least important circumstance, the time when there is a natural (sincere) circular-tie. Aside from that, as I said, natural circular ties are considered uncommon. You said: This is a very traditional process. Nothing new in it. I'll give an approximate description of the process in Finland. In the polling station there are many representatives from many parties, monitoring the process. The votes are counted (information collected) right after the election ends, again together on one table by multiple people from multiple parties. After that the votes are sealed and sent for storage. I don't recall any serious problems or complaints. With complex votes the process would take more time, and there could be a need to double check, but the principles would probably stay the same. [endquote] I guess I must have missed the part about digitization. Anyway, though the ballots should, of course, be saved, they should also be _tallied_ right there in public, in front of the multiparty observers. That's what I suggest for Approval counts. You can't do that for a rank method. You can do it for Approval. > >> Did the voter hirself make out a paper ballot? Or >> was it made electronically by a voting machine (presumably, but not >> necessarily based on the voter's voting)? > > Use of paper ballots is the traditional and reliable method. Ballots that are > printed by a machine >are still theoretically quite safe, ...only if the machine is printing what the voter says :-) You continued: but in practice not quite at the same level. [endquote] No, not quite :-) > >> And, if the voter made out the paper ballot, then you've got millions >> of paper ballots, distributed around the country (our large country). > > No need for transport around the country. They could as well be sealed and > stored locally after >ballot data has been collected. Juho, our local precincts are all around the country. You continued: And maybe better so (to store them under the eyes of all the locals who don't want their opinions to be falsified). [endquote] Not wanting their opinions falsified, and not getting their opinions falsified, aren't quite the same thing. Security can't be perfect. Best to do the actual tally of the candidates totals during the public count process. You still save and store the ballots, but you don't depend on them for count verifiability. That tally during the public count procedure pretty much disqualifies all rank methods, and anything other than Approval or Plurality. Maybe Score. > >> How do you propose to show them to anyone who wants to look at them? > > I don't. For most EM experts the digitized information should be enough. Only > if the end product of the digitization is really what the voter wrote on hir > ballot. You said: A different procedure applies for the ballot digitization. [endquote] Yes, that's the problem, isn't it. > >> And, as I asked before, why do you want to be guessing and hoping, >> when it's possible to simply be rid of favorite-burial incentive? > > There are numerous different threats, and we should minimize them, starting > from the worst >problems. What are these other threats that you refer to? Let me guess: You don't know, and you were going to ask me :-) I've compared Symmetrical ICT to unimproved Condorcet, by a number of criteria, including Condorcet's Criterion. I've compared them in regards to electing the legitimately-defined CW. You said: Sufficient protection against favourite burial is needed, but 100% protection (against all possible strategic ballot sets) may well be too much. One need to defend only against practical threats. Same with all other threats. [endquote] With you, of course, deciding how much protection is practical. Such hoping isn't needed when a method outright doesn't have the problem. You want to imply that, though SITC doesn't have a favorite-burial problem, or a chicken dilemma, or a Later-No-Help failure, and elects the legitimately-defined CW (unlike unimproved Condorcet), there is some other need that it doesn't meet, or some other threat that it doesn't protect against, or some other necessary guarantee that it doesn't offer.. But you can't tell us what it is. Your best argument is that there _might_ be one :-) > >>> I know at least one person that is inclined to bury and probably would bury >> >> Then you know that the problem is genuine. >> >>> :-). > > Probably there are some random irrational strategic votes in every large > election :-). ...And it's only a question of how many "some" is. You don't know. You speculate that it won't be many, "in most societies" or "in many societies". I'm more concerned about this particular society, in this country. You admit that you don't know about that, and there's no reason for anyone to say that you should know about that. You clarify that you're only speaking in general, about "most societies" or "many societies". Fine. But as for _random_ strategic votes, they aren't really random. They're predictable and systematic. They're heavily recommended by the mass media. You seem to be missing that. And the favorite-burials are indeed irrational, in the sense that the premise for choosing them is irrational. But, given that premise, the favorite-burial is quite rational, optimal strategy. > >>> But don't take medicine >>> that harms you more than the disease. >> >> Ok, so then tell us how ICT and Symmetrical ICT would do harm. >> >> And tell us your proposal for a method that wouldn't. > > Again, see the beginning of this mail. Translation: You can't name a way that SITC would do harm, and can't name a method that would do better. >> "Next time, don't let that happen. Next time, rank the Democrat in 1st >> place, because otherwise the Progressive will win again." You replied: > My guess is that Republican leaders (in Burlington) would not make such a > recommendation unless it would be very clear that the Republican candidate > can not win. [...] Fine. For national elections, the mass media continually, daily, hammer home the message that the Dems and Repubs are "the two choices". ...the message that no one can win other than the Dems and Repubs. With great success, in fact, the media often imply that there _are_ no other parties, and that there are no non-disastrous positions, no positions that should even be considered or heard, other than the Dem and Repub policies. So yes, the media do indeed "make such a recommendation." They make it every day, on every channel and station, and everyone accepts it. It would be nice to educate everyone differently. I don't think the mass media want to. But there are voting systems that, even to someone who believes the media (which is most everyone), there would be no reason to do favorite-burial. Approval, Score, and Symmetrical ICT are a few of those methods. You speak of "most societies". Maybe "most societies" aren't (voluntarily) a captive audience of our mass media. Mike Ossipoff ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
