I'd said: >>> But thank you for demonstrating (as if it needed more demonstrating on >>> EM) the impossibility of ever adopting or enacting a rank-method, due >>> to the innumerable different methods advocated by rank-method >>> advocates, who will never be able to agree on one; and due to the >>> innumerable criteria by which they "justify" their favorite methods. >>>
Bristow said: > i can live with one basic criterion: > > if more voters agree that Candidate A is a better choice than Candidate B > than the number of voters that prefer B, then if at all possible, let's not > elect Candidate B. > > simple, and hard to argue with. > > but i know that Mike will argue with it. I don't argue with it. I wouldn't argue with a criterion unless it were incompatible with properties that I consider necessary or important. My only proposals for official public elections are Approval, and maybe Score. Some of their properties: They meet FBC, Later-No-Help, Mono-Add-Top, Participation, Mono-Add-Plump, Monotonicity, Consistency, IIAC, Voted-Majority, and Pareto. The 1st 4 of those criteria aren't met by many methods. Some of the others, such as Pareto, Monotonicity and Voted-Majority are met by many methods. I don't consider IIAC to be necessary, but it still makes sense and has some desirability. So Bristow's criterion is compatible with the most important properties, and with the only methods that I advocate for official public elections. Though Approval and Score meet that criterion, all Condorcet methods fail that criterion. Mike Ossipoff > > -- > > r b-j [email protected] > > "Imagination is more important than knowledge." > > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
