Andy: > IIAC merely says that removal of a losing candidate shouldn't change > the result. > > IIAC says nothing about whether there should be another election if a > losing candidate calls for one without hir in it.. > > IIAC is merely about consistent count-mechanics, given an unchanging > set of ballots. >
Well, you're arguing for a definition of IIAC that even plurality passes. Yes. One nice thing about Approval and Score is that they pass every criterion that Plurality passes. That can't be said for MJ or any Condorcet version. That means that no one can say that there is any way in which Approval or Score could be called worse than Plurality. That's important for enactment proposals. I think that my definition of IIAC is only one that's been precisely and completely defined. You continued: I find it lacking [endquote] It isn't the most demanding criterion, and it's met by Plurality, and so no one can claim that meeting IIAC makes a method adequate. In fact, meeting IIAC, Participation, Mono-Add-Top, Mono-Add-Unique-Top, Consistency, Non-Dictatorshiip and Mono-Raise obviously doesn't make a method adequate, since Plurality meets all of those criteria. But just because Plurality meets a criterion doesn't make it irrelevant. Non-Dictatorship is a desirable criterion, even though Plurality meets it. . You continued: , and do not accept it for my definition of "independence of irrelevant alternatives". [endquote] But won't it have to do until someone offers a different complete and precise definition of IIAC? I have nothing against there being two kinds of IIAC. They'd have to be named differently. Maybe the new one could be called "Strong IIAC". It might be a very desirable and worthwhile criterion, when someone defines it. If someone already has, I invite someone to post it. Mike Ossipoff ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
