[quote] V_A>B is the number of ballots that rank A above B. V_A is the number of ballots that rank A at the top. S_A = sum_B M_AB V_B is the score for >* candidate A. * ** M_AB can be any antisymmetric function of V_A>B and V_B>A that is positive if V_A>B > V_B>A. examples: M_AB = V_A>B - V_B>A M_AB = (V_A>B - V_B>A)/(V_A>B + V_B>A) M_AB = sign(V_A>B - V_A<B)
Eliminate the candidate with lowest score. Recalculate V_A's and S_A's. Repeat until one candidate remains [endquote] But, when introducing, proposing or advocating a method, it's necessary to tell the _rationale_. What problem is solved, or what goal is met, or what purpose is served by compliance with Clone-Independence and the Condorcet Criterion? What is it that identifies the combination of Clone-Independence and the Condorcet Criterion as the basis for choosing evaluating or choosing a method? I claim that, under current conditions, a method must meet FBC in order to be adequate. Current conditions consist of 1) A disinformational media system that promote the belief that only the Democrat or Republican can win, and that therefore corruption is unavoidable,and that therefore corruption is acceptable; and 2) A public who believe that, and who believe that the election of the Republican would be an unprecedented disaster. Under current conditions, FBC-failing methods typically or always, for Progressive>Democrat>Republican voters, have an optimal strategy of voting the Democrat over everyone else. Approval and Score are the familiar and simple, and most enactable, FBC-complying methods. Regarding Green scenario conditions, I've said a lot about the benefits of the powerful combination of MMC and CD, possessed by IRV and Condorcet-IRV (CIRV). Michael Ossipoff
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